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A. Introduction 
 
The European Union rides through troubled waters. Its original reliance on law as the 
object and agent of the integration project and on the “economic constitution,” which the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)—as accomplished by the Treaty of Maastricht—
expected to complete, have proven unsustainable. Following the financial and sovereign 
debt crises, individuals perceive the EMU, with its commitments to price stability and 
monetary politics, as a failed construction precisely because of its reliance on inflexible 
rules. The European crisis management seeks to compensate for these failures by means of 
regulatory machinery which disregards the European order of competences, takes power 
from national institutions, and burdens—in particular—Southern Europe with austerity 
measures; it establishes pan-European commitments to budgetary discipline and 
macroeconomic balancing. This abolishes the ideal of a legal ordering of the European 
economy, while the economic and social prospects of these efforts appear gloomy and the 
Union’s political legitimacy becomes precarious. A fictitious debate between Carl Schmitt 
and Jürgen Habermas addresses the present critical constellation, where a number of 
Schmittian notions seem alarmingly realistic. This essay pleads for a more modest Europe 
committing itself to “unity in diversity,” the motto of the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty of 
2003. 
 
                                            
* University of Bremen, Research Professor; Co-Director, Centre of European Law and Politics, University of 
Bremen; Senior Professor for Law and Society, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin. E-mail: 
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by Sandra H. Lustig, Hamburg, and Matthew G. Harris, Buchen/Odw., in the ZenTra Working Papers in 
Transnational Studies No. 6/2012. In the course of these revisions, the text has not only increased in size but also 
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help. 
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B. Preliminary Note on the Course of the Debate 
 
Europe faces troubling times. Constructive suggestions—such as the federal finality that 
Joschka Fischer sought to promote in his legendary lecture at the Humboldt University in 
Berlin
1
 more than ten years ago—no longer sound credible. They now stand in contrast 
with the endless and frenzied crisis management that has placed its stamp of rigid 
austerity policy on the “periphery” of what was to evolve into an “ever closer Union.” The 
rule of law and the project of “integration through law” are at stake, concepts which 
characterized and connected European law scholarship transnationally
2
 in the formative 
phase of the integration project and for a good while thereafter. Europe is far from hosting 
“the most competitive, knowledge-based economy in the world” as the Lisbon Council 
proclaimed in the year 2000;
3
 its economy stands at the core of the present crisis. 
European constitutionalism, which dominated academic discussions for a decade and 
thoroughly neglected the inherently political dimensions of the “Economic,” has been 
silenced. 
 
Paradoxically, the same holds true for Germany’s Ordo-liberalism and its project of an 
“economic constitution.” According to this school of thought, the legitimacy of the 
European project rested upon the legal ordering of the economy,
4
 the economic freedoms 
of the EEC Treaty—a system of undistorted competition—and an economic policy 
“complying with justiciable criteria.”
5
 These stood as the potential cornerstones of this 
order, to orient the integration process in a way by which the European polity would be 
legitimized by—and reduced to—an economic ordo whose validity did not depend upon 
                                            
1 Joschka Fischer, Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation—Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration 
[From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration] (May 12, 2000), http://whi-
berlin.de/documents/fischer.pdf. See also WHAT KIND OF CONSTITUTION FOR WHAT KIND OF POLITY? RESPONSES TO 
JOSCHKA FISCHER (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2000) (illustrating how widely the lecture was noted). 
2 A chapter from Joseph H.H. Weiler’s Ph.D. thesis was ground-breaking, see Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Community 
System: The Dual Character of Suprenationalism, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 257–306 (1981), and then the seminal work he 
orchestrated, INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 
1985).  
3 See Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon Council of Mar. 23–24 2000, EUR. PARL. DOC., 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm. 
4 See Christian Joerges, What is left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy, 30 EUR. L. REV. 
461, 465 (2005); Christian Joerges, Europa nach dem Ordoliberalismus: Eine Philippika, 43 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 394 
(2010). 
5 Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Macht-Recht-Wirtschaftsverfassun, 137 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 97, 106 (1973). The essay is the elaboration of the  lecture which he have at the Verein für 
Socialpolitik conference in Bonn in 1972. Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Power, Law and Economic Constitution,  11 
GERMAN ECON. REV. 177–192 (1973).  
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democratic credentials, let alone upon the transformation of Europe into a fully-fledged 
federal state.
6
 
 
This idea guided and accompanied Ordo-liberalism’s path to Europe. Nobody championed 
or developed it more consistently than Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker. One of his seminal 
essays explained that the pressure to harmonize, stemming from integration, would 
become stronger.
7
 A Common Monetary Policy would mean “ultimately giving up” the 
opportunity to maintain far-reaching differences between the economic orders.
8
 
 
The Community for which the original ordo-liberal concepts were conceived—and to which 
Mestmäcker referred—looks nothing less than idyllic from today’s perspective. It was both 
smaller and more homogeneous than the current Union. For this reason alone, the 
incorporation of the project of integration through law, particularly its commitments to a 
legal ordering of economic policy (Ordnungspolitik), no longer seem viable. By now, 
individuals see the symptoms of a deep crisis and the necessity for developing new 
perspectives for the European project appears irrefutable. One cannot reverse the course 
of history, but one can analyze and try to understand how and why the configuration of 
the relationship between law and politics in the integration project has contributed to the 
“integration failure” which we are now witnessing in the current crisis. This essay proceeds 
in five steps. 
 
The first step, taken somewhat in haste, concerns the Weberian notion of the nation-state 
and its pursuit of power through economic strength. The second involves the taming of the 
self-same nation-state by law and the de-coupling of the European economic constitution 
from the labor and social constitutions of the nation-states, which presents itself to the 
one—Ordo-liberal—side as nothing but a logical implication of the establishment of a 
European economic order, while other political quarters perceive this disconnection as a 
threat to the legacy of the welfare state. This is followed by an analysis of the various 
                                            
6 See MILÈNE WEGMANN, FRÜHER NEOLIBERALISMUS UND EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION (2002) (re-constructing this scenario 
thoroughly). Her work corresponds instructively to Wolfgang Fikentscher’s earlier magnum opus on 
Wirtschaftsrecht (economic law). Id. Decades before the studies on global governance, European governance, the 
relation between the levels and the impact of transnational governance on national statehood became en vogue 
in political science, and “constitutionalism beyond the state” became everybody’s concern in legal scholarship, 
Fikentscher had conceptualized WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (1983) in truly transnational and constitutional perspectives, 
and composed the two monumental volumes accordingly: The first volume is dedicated to Weltwirtschaftsrecht 
(world economic law) and Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht (European economic law); national economic law 
(Deutsches Wirtschaftsrecht) is presented upon this basis. This conceptualization documents the truly universalist 
commitments of the ordo-liberal tradition which Wegmann emphasises in her reconstruction of the ordo-liberal 
tradition.  
7 Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Address at the Verein für Socialpolitik Conference: Macht-Recht-
Wirtschaftsverfassung [Power-Law-Economic Constitution] (1972); Mestmäcker, supra note 5, at 109.  
8 Mestmäcker, supra note 5, at 109.  
9 8 8  G e r m a n  L a w  J o u r n a l   [Vol. 15 No. 05 
dimensions of the integration project’s problems, referring to Karl Polanyi’s economic 
sociology. The next section elaborates on these remarks, dealing with the establishment 
and the crisis of Europe’s EMU and including an overview of Europe’s new “crisis law” and 
its assessment by the German Constitutional Court (FCC) and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). The dramatic nature of our current situation will then be 
illustrated by means of a fictitious debate between Carl Schmitt and Jürgen Habermas. In 
the analysis of this debate, Carl Schmitt’s theorems will prove to be frighteningly realistic: 
“But where danger threatens, that which saves from it also grows.”
9
 What kind of regime 
did Europe impose on itself, and what does this mean for European citizenship? These 
challenges will be addressed in the Epilogue, which will also tentatively consider an 
alternative vision to both the frightening as well as the possibly merely voluntarist 
scenarios on the future of the European integration project. 
 
C. Max Weber’s Nationalstaat 
 
The steps towards European integration after World War II document how we overcame 
our bellicose past. At the same time, the designers of the project wanted to rein in the 
economic militancy of the nation-state. Max Weber formulated his perception of that 
nation-state in his 1895 inaugural Freiburg address as follows: 
  
Our successors will not hold us responsible before 
history for the kind of economic organization we hand 
over to them, but rather for the amount of elbow-room 
we conquer for them in the world and leave behind us. 
Processes of economic development are in the final 
analysis also power struggles, and the ultimate and 
decisive interests at whose service economic policy 
must place itself are the interests of national power, 
where these interests are in question. The science of 
political economy is a political science. It is a servant of 
politics, not the day-to-day politics of the individuals 
and classes who happen to be ruling at a particular 
time, but the lasting power-political interests of the 
nation. And for us the national state is not, as some 
people believe, an indeterminate entity raised higher 
and higher into the clouds in proportion as one clothes 
its nature in mystical darkness, but the temporal 
power-organization of the nation, and in this national 
                                            
9 FRIEDRICH HÖLDERLIN, PATMOS DEM LANDGRAFEN VON HOMBURG ÜBERREICHTE HANDSCHRIFT (1802), quoted in FRIEDRICH 
HÖDERLIN WERKE 379 (1954), translated in MICHAEL HAMBURGER, FRIEDRICH HÖLDERLIN, SELECTED POEMS AND FRAGMENTS 
243 (1994).  
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state the ultimate standard of value for economic 
policy is “reason of state”. There is a strange 
misinterpretation of this view current to the effect that 
we advocate “state assistance” instead of “self-help:, 
state regulation of economic life instead of the free 
play of economic forces. We do not. Rather we wish 
under this slogan of “reason of state” to raise the 
demand that for questions of German economic 
policy—including the question of whether, and how far, 
the state should intervene in economic life, and when it 
should rather untie the economic forces of the nation 
and tear down the barriers in the way of their free 
development—the ultimate and decisive voice should 
be that of the economic and political interests of our 
nation’s power, and the vehicle of that power, the 
German national state.
10
 
 
“It was not the agreement of many audience members with the following remarks, but 
their dissent that prompted me to publish them,” Weber wrote in the preliminary notes to 
the publication of his lecture.
11
 This text has weathered these concerns well. He developed 
a profoundly thought-through in terms of economic theory, sociology, and history, and—
despite all its jingoistic pronouncements—also stands as a critique of the lack of political 
capacity of the German political class.
12
 The martial tone of Weber’s lecture clearly spells 
out a target of the European project as people understood it later, particularly in Freiburg 
when that city had become the intellectual Heimat of the Ordo-liberal School. 
 
D. The Civilizing Accomplishment and Asymmetry of the EEC Treaty 
 
In his seminal lecture of 1972, Mestmäcker has explained succinctly how Ordo-liberalism 
has liberated itself from the legacy of Weber’s Nationalstaat. He stated:   
 
What is historic about the EEC Treaty is that it 
integrates the internationality of economic 
relationships into the internationality of law and 
political institutions. In this sense, the EEC Treaty 
                                            
10 Max Weber, The National State and Economic Policy (Freiburg Address), 9 ECON. & SOC’Y 428, 438 (Ben Fowkes 
trans., 1980) (1895). 
11 Max Weber, Inaugural Lecture at Freiburg: Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik (May 1895), at 1–2.   
12 See Rita Aldenhoff, Nationalökonomie, Nationalstaat und Werturteile. Wissenschaftskritik in Max Webers 
Freiburger Antrittsrede im Kontext der Wissenschaftsdebatten in den 1890er Jahren, in DEUTSCHE RECHTS– UND 
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE UM 1900 79–90 (Gerhard Sprenger ed., 1991).  
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includes an economic constitution . . . Expressed in 
terms of state and society, the EEC takes as its starting 
point the law of bourgeois society and its institutions as 
the first manifestation of the universal in the 
international realm.
13
 
 
This all now has a price. The liberation from the Weberian Nationalstaat came about 
through the imposition of legal commitments and constraints on the political autonomy of 
sovereign states. Due to these constraints, it became possible “to conceptualise an 
economic policy that can be bound to legal and constitutional norms.”
14
 Not only are the 
contents of economic policy affected by these demands, but the competencies of 
legislation and its scope
15
 and the details of free collective-bargaining and co-
determination. 
 
This touches upon a sensitive issue. Even if we assume that the Treaties of Rome have 
established a European economic constitution, they nonetheless remain silent concerning 
labor and social law. This is why a functional equivalent of the “social Rechtsstaat,” in the 
sense of Article 20(1) German Basic Law or of the “social market economy,” as Alfred 
Müller-Armack programmatically developed it
16
 could not establish itself at the European 
level. Fritz W. Scharpf considers the implications of this finding—the separation of the 
economic and social constitutions—to be a design-flaw that places Europe’s social 
integration at long-term risk.
17
 These statements are sociologically based, and meant in a 
socio-political way. A different question concerns explaining how this decision came about; 
another concerns whether such explanations are normatively instructive and what legally 
binding effect may be granted to this initial situation. People widely view the reduction of 
the European social and labor constitution to the EEC Treaty’s principle of non-
discrimination as a successful negotiation on the part of Germany, supposed to have been 
worth attaining at the expense of agricultural policy. Now, the parties agreed upon the 
                                            
13 Mestmäcker, supra note 5, at 108–09. 
14 Mestmäcker, supra note 5, at 102. 
15 Mestmäcker, supra note 5, at 103. 
16 See ALFRED MÜLLER-ARMACK, WIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG UND WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK. STUDIEN UND KONZEPTE ZUR SOZIALEN 
MARKTWIRTSCHAFT UND ZUR EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION (1966); ALFRED MÜLLER-ARMACK, GENEALOGIE DER SOZIALEN 
MARKTWIRTSCHAFT. FRÜHSCHRIFTEN UND WEITERFÜHRENDE KONZEPTE (1974). 
17 Fritz W. Scharpf, The Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU Cannot be a “Social Market Economy,” 
8 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 211–250 (2010) (including references to earlier works); see Florian Rödl, Die Idee 
demokratischer und sozialer Union im Verfassungsrecht der EU [The Idea of a Democratic and Social Union in the 
Constitutional Law of the EU], in WOHLFAHRTSSTAATLICHKEIT UND SOZIALE DEMOKRATIE IN DER EU [Welfarism and Social 
Democracy in the EU] 1 EUROPARECHT 179–204 (Jürgen Bast & Florian Rödl eds., 2013). 
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quid pro quo under the influence of the welfare promises of the Ohlin Report,
18
 impressing 
the political left at the time and taking place in the era of “embedded liberalism,”
19
 in 
which the opening up of national economies seemed compatible with the establishment of 
welfare-state systems.
20
 
 
What does all this mean in legal terms? Is this an irreversible “decision” about the 
alternatives of a planned economy versus a market economy? Or is this a constitutional 
compromise, similarly to how Hermann Heller found the Weimar Constitution to be a 
compromise; permanently binding guidelines for developing the relationship between the 
economic and labor constitutions in Europe?
21
 Both positions suffer from the same 
difficulty. They treat the results of political negotiations as though they were the results of 
an assembly convened to draw up a constitution. So, is this merely a piece of history, 
whose further course is to be accepted as a kind of normative fact that we no longer can 
influence retroactively? This sequence of question marks indicates that there is no 
conclusive answer available. The constitutional configuration of the integration project is in 
permanent flux. Consolidated constitutional democracies too have to adapt to changing 
contextual conditions. But they tend to be more disciplined in the processes of 
adaptation.
22
 In the EU Treaty, changes have become so burdensome that they are no 
longer conceivable. This is why the European praxis resorts ever-more evasive techniques 
and informal transformations of its order.  
 
To put this slightly differently: European integration as a project without a defined finalité; 
it is adjusting to the dynamics of a development whose decoding is impossible without 
extra-legal means. We encounter such undertakings everywhere. Undoubtedly, the resort 
to Karl Polanyi—which now follows—is so far unusual. We submit that this is a promising 
encounter. 
  
                                            
18 Int’l Lab. Org., Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation: Report by a Group of Experts, 74 INT’L LAB. 
REV. 99–123 (1956). 
19 John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic 
Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 375, 392 (1982). 
20 See Claire M. O’Brien, The UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights: Re-embedding or dis-
embedding transnational markets?, in KARL POLANYI: GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL 
MARKETS 323–357 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011) (discussing Ruggie’s later view). 
21 Florian Rödl, Labour Constitution, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 605–640 (Armin von Bogdandy & 
Jürgen Bast eds., 2010); STEFANO GIUBBONI, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND MARKET FREEDOMS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION: A 
LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVE 7–15 (2006).  
22 In principle, Hans Peter Ipsen’s term “continuous re-configuration,” (Wandelverfassung) means nothing else. 
See Hans Peter Ipsen, Europäische Verfassung—Nationale Verfassung, in EUROPARECHT 195, 201 (1987).  
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E. Symptoms of Europe’s Crisis in the Light of Karl Polanyi’s Economic Sociology 
 
Karl Polanyi is one of the three Viennese émigrés who grappled with fascism towards the 
end of World War II. The other two are Friedrich August von Hayek
23
 and Karl Popper.
24
 
Polanyi took up the issue in his brief monograph, first published in 1944.
25
 His analysis is 
specific, “embedded” in a re-construction of the core instability of industrial capitalism. 
This analysis lays heavy emphasis on the role played within capitalist society by three 
“fictitious commodities:” Money, labor, and land. These three fictitious commodities 
denote “goods” (Waren) which nonetheless predate and transcend “the market,” and 
whose subsequent “commodification” not only provokes crises both within and around 
capitalism, but also prove to be an impetus for counter-movements to the market.
26
 In 
view of the chronic instability within the EMU, the steady erosion of national labor and 
social constitutions, and continuing conflicts in the area of energy policy, Polanyi’s theses 
and conclusions have gained a remarkable degree of general topicality. The following 
analysis limits itself within this paradigm to the European “integration through law 
project,” and to the question of what European law has experienced, is experiencing, and 
what it has precipitated. This is not a matter, for example, of a generalized condemnation 
of market processes, at least not for strong voices in the Polanyian tradition.
27
 Polanyi’s 
thesis that treating fictitious goods as marketable products cannot come about smoothly is 
anything but comforting: Marketization of labor, land and money, he warned, will trigger 
crises and counter-movements. In view of the present state of the European Union, the 
erosion of the labor and social constitution, and the looming conflicts about the future of 
atomic energy, Polanyi’s diagnoses are astonishingly topical.
28
 
 
In the present constellation of conflict inter-dependencies, we must remain sensitive 
towards pertinent problems in their specific contexts. Drawing a line from Polanyi’s 
                                            
23 FRIEDRICH AUGUST VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
24 KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1945). 
25 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2001). See, e.g., Jens 
Beckert, MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/6: The Social Order of Markets, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES 
(2007); WOLFGANG STREECK, RE-FORMING CAPITALISM: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 154–156 
(2009); Fred Block & Marget E. Somers, Karl Polanyi and the Writing of The Great Transformation, in THE POWER OF 
MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM: KARL POLANY’S CRITIQUE 73–97 (2014) (discussing Polanyi’s topicality).  
26 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT  TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 69 (2001). 
27 See Alexander Ebner, Transnational Markets and the Polanyi Problem, in KARL POLANYI: GLOBALISATION AND THE 
POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 19, 29 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011). 
28 See Christian Joerges, Law and Politics in Europe’s Crisis: On the History of the Impact of an Unfortunate 
Configuration, 21 CONSTELLATIONS (forthcoming 2014). The growing interest in Polanyi and the renaissance of 
economic sociology is due to current events, but is nonetheless more robust. See references supra note 25.  
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fictitious commodities to atomic energy is a stretch and may go too far, but it is not absurd 
to regard atomic energy as a non-marketable good.
29
 In any case, the insight that the 
economic success of this type of energy is due not to natural evolutionary processes, but to 
the establishment of markets by political fiat instead, is irrefutable. European law plays an 
unfortunate role here. The Euratom Treaty of 1957
30
 was in a position to declare atomic 
energy the technology of the future par excellence, but did not Europeanize it, leaving the 
decision about its use to the nation-states.
31
 The Treaty of Lisbon did not change this in any 
way,
32
 with the consequence that a phasing-out of atomic energy in Europe can only take 
place if all the Member States were to implement it, a scenario that definitely is nowhere 
in sight. 
 
The consequences of de-coupling the labor and economic constitutions from one another 
either remained unobserved for a long time or parties presented them as being rectifiable. 
The notion that a “European social model” would take the place of the diverse variants of 
the Western European welfare states stood as no more than a pale utopian dream. This 
became apparent after the enlargement towards the East. At that juncture, the socio-
economic disparities became so pronounced that a continuation of integration was 
feasible only in the form of “negative integration by reducing the social protection 
provided by welfare states. This strategy was initiated by the European Commission in 
collaboration with actors representing relevant interests in both the old and new Member 
States. The Viking, Laval, and Rüffert
33
 decisions are the most striking legal, partial-
victories, which can be viewed together as a confirmation of the decision to treat an 
economic constitution as a “pure” market constitution and as the abandonment of the 
                                            
29 Polanyi states: “To allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their 
natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of 
society . . . [N]o society could stand the effects of such a system of crude fictions even for the shortest stretch of 
time unless its human and natural substance as well as its business organization was protected against the 
ravages of this satanic mill.” See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR 
TIME 73 (2001). 
30 Euratom Treaty, Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 
30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 84) 1 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty]. 
31 The silence of the Euratom Treaty is deafening: The EAEC Treaty did not grant the Community the competence 
to “authorise the construction or operation of nuclear installations.” See Comm’n v. Council, CJEU Case C–29/99, 
2002 E.C.R. I–11281/11311, para. 89. See Christian Joerges, The Timeliness of Direct Democracy in the EU – and 
the contest over atomic energy in conflicts-law perspectives in INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN LEGAL 
EDUCATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ERASMUS INTENSIVE PROGRAMME NICLAS 2010–2012, 89-100 (Jürgen Busch et al. eds., 
2014) (critizing this legal situation).. 
32 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 194, Oct. 26, 2010, 2010 O.J. 
(C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
33 Int’l Transp. Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, CJEU Case C–438/05, 2007 E.C.R. I–10779; Laval un Partneri Ltd. 
v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, CJEU Case C–341/05, 2007 E.C.R. I–11767; Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 
CJEU Case C–346/06, 2008 E.C.R. I–01989. 
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common European constitutional compromise. One must also keep in mind, although, 
what this means with regard to the acceptance of the project of integration. If Polanyi’s 
diagnoses are correct, then we must anticipate counter-movements seeking to restore 
perspectives calling for social protection, and such signals are becoming ever more visible 
after Europe’s transformation into an “austerity union.” 
 
F. The Crisis of Economic and Monetary Union and the European Rule of Law 
 
These very brief remarks must suffice so that space remains for the financial crisis that 
overshadows everything now.
34
  
 
I. Juridification of Monetary Union 
 
The financial crisis concerned the EMU as it took shape in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. 
The EMU was doubtless a political project, albeit one strictly from the influence of daily 
politics and entrusted instead to the medium of law. It was not “alternativlos” (without 
alternative), as is claimed today. In the 1970s, the Werner-Davignon Plans had attempted 
to synthesize the economic and social constitutions.
35
 During these years, a general 
departure from Keynesianism came about; Keynesianism had been legally anchored in 
Germany in the 1967 Stability Act (Stabilitätsgesetz),
36
 realizing the “magical quadrant”—
price stability, high employment, balance of payments, and appropriately increasing 
economic growth—a balancing act that seemed very precarious to many renowned 
German constitutionalists at the time because it had to be entrusted to the evaluation and 
discretionary decision-making of the political authorities. While German traditionalists 
worried about rule-guided Ordnungspolitik, in Great Britain, the post-war welfare-state 
acquis was revoked. Such a background constellation provided a strong political basis for a 
new European consensus that was expressed in the project of the single market and the 
turn to monetarist concepts. Paradigm shifts of this kind do not simply follow theoretical 
reason, nor should their effective rejection be regarded as evidence of the success of the 
prevailing paradigm without further ado.
37
 
                                            
34 Christian Joerges, Unity in Diversity as Europe’s Vocation and Conflicts Law as Europe’s Constitutional Form, in 
THE CHANGING ROLE OF LAW IN THE AGE OF SUPRA- AND TRANS-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE 125, 151–61 (Rainer Nickel & Andrea 
Greppi eds., 2014) (discussing this issue more extensively).  
35 HAGEN SCHULZ-FORBERG & BO STRÅTH, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE HYPOCRISY OF DEMOCRACY-
THROUGH-MARKET 43 (2010).  
36 Christian Joerges, The Idea of a Three-dimensional Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 413, 420 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann eds., 2011). 
37 See MAURICE GLASMAN, UNNECESSARY SUFFERING: MANAGING MARKET UTOPIA 96, 98 (1996); FRITZ W. SCHARPF, 
Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis, and the Pre-emption of Democracy, 2–24 (5 MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/11, 2011) 
(discussing this in the context of the 1970s); see also COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEO-LIBERALISM 49–
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In the case of Europe’s economic-policy orientation, individuals can discern two stages of 
re-orientation. First, Commission President Jacques Delors obtained broad support for his 
project of a single market, perceived as an institutionalization of economic rationality: A 
commitment to principles designed to guide all political action.
38
 The Monetary Union and 
the Stability Pact
39
 were understood as complementary projects, as institutionalizing an 
independent central bank outside all political spaces and beyond the institutional structure 
of the Union designed to consummate the new architecture and fossilize a supranational 
economic constitution. 
 
This understanding is deeply flawed. What the Treaty of Maastricht has established 
through the separation of Europeanised monetary policy from national fiscal and economic 
policy can best be characterised as a “diagonal conflict”. This notion requires an 
explanatory remark:
40
 Monetary policy has become an exclusive competence of the Union 
(Article 3(1) c TFEU). With this provision, the Union claims supremacy in the policy area 
conferred to it, a conferral which did not include economic and fiscal policies. However, 
the exercise of these policies by the Member States can have effects which destruct the 
operation of monetary policy as adminstered by the Ruropean Central Bank (ECB). As 
experienced so drastically after 1992, the potential and actual tensions between monetary 
policy and the national policies cannot be controlled. This tension is not a vertical conflict 
for which arguably the supremacy principle could provide a response. It is a “diagonal 
conflict” in the just-defined sense because both the Union and the Member States are 
certainly interested in the functioning of their economies, but the powers required to 
accomplish this objective are attributed to two distinct levels of governance with often 
irreconcilable policy preferences. The type of conflict resolution foreseen in Article 119 
TFEU is “the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of 
Member States’ economic policies” as substantiated in Article 121 TFEU  and has proved to 
unworkable;this deficiency cannot be cured under the provisions of the Treaty of 
Maastricht and the soft law of the Stability Pact.  
                                                                                                                
124 (2011); Peter E. Hall, Commentary, Brother, Can You Paradigm?, 26 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y, ADMIN. 
&INSTITUTIONS 189 (2013) (evaluting this matter in the present). 
38 See M. Rainer Lepsius, Institutionalisierung und Deinstitutionalisierung von Rationalitätskriterien, in  
INSTITUTIONENWANDEL, LEVIATHAN SONDERHEFT 16/1996 57 (Gerhard Göhler ed., 1997); see also M. Rainer Lepsius, The 
European Union as a Sovereignty Association of a Special Nature, in WHAT KIND OF CONSTITUTION FOR WHAT KIND OF 
POLITY? 213–222 (Christian Joerges, Yves Mény & Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., 2000) (considering how this applies to 
Europe). 
39 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, 1997 O.J. (C 236); TFEU art. 126. 
40 See Christian Joerges, Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy: A Plea for a Supranational Conflict of Laws, in 
DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 311, 318 (Beate Kohler-Koch & Berthold Rittberger eds., 
2007); see also GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN GLOBALIZATION 158–163 
(2012) (discussing this issue further). 
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The decision by the FCC on the Treaty of Maastricht literally had a decisive part in making 
this misfortune come about, when it declared replacing politics by legal rules to be a sine 
qua non for Germany’s participation, both in terms of content and institutionally.
41
 The 
remarkably complex reasoning of the Court’s Second Senate first dealt with the plaintiff’s 
argumentation that the European Union had, under the new provisions, such far-reaching 
competence that the nation-states were no longer in a position to discharge important 
tasks. This called the continuing existence of “democratic statehood” into question. This 
argumentation also referred to monetary policy. But the Court then responded by 
occupying the spaces for democratically shaping policy with law. In so doing, it embraced 
the—in this instance, compatible—Ordo-liberal and monetarist theorems, and gave them a 
legal form: Economic integration, the Court said, was an apolitical process that both could 
and was permitted to take shape autonomously and beyond the Member States. Monetary 
Union was constituted appropriately via a constitutional duty to guarantee price stability 
and regulations to counter excessive budget deficits.
 
In this way, the objections to the 
democratic legitimacy of economic integration seemed to resolve themselves. In the 
public-law divisions of European legal studies in both Germany and in the larger quarters 
of European constitutionalism, scholars either did not even realize this, or they did not 
deem it worthy of mention.
42
 
 
II. Processes of Erosion 
 
In Mestmäcker’s account, what is at stake is power struggle between the political and the 
economic, which in his view, its law which must enjoy the highest authority.
43
 Yet, this 
authority proved unable to prevail. The situation is more dramatic today. But the rules 
agreed upon were flawed in substance, and if they had been enforced, this would have 
caused harm. In line with this widely shared view, the very short life of the new legal 
                                            
41 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2 BvR 2159/92, 89 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155 (Oct. 12, 1993). See Christian Joerges, States 
Without a Market: Comments on the German Constitutional Court’s Maastricht-Judgment and a Plea for 
Interdisciplinary Discourses (NISER Working Paper, 1996), available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/1997-020.pdf; 
Michelle Everson, Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the Necessary Cunning of Constitutional Law, 4 EUR. 
L. J. 389 (1998). 
42 Instead, the Court was confronted with its talk of an “association of states,” its announcement that it would 
refuse to follow ultra vires legal acts, but above all, the statement that its democratic rule presupposes that a 
“relatively homogeneous people” has the opportunity “to give legal expression to what unifies them—
intellectually, socially, and politically.” Joseph H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on 
Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 EUR. L. J. 219 (1995); see infra text accompanying notes 44–
50. 
43 See Ernst-Joachum Mestmäcker, Europäische Prüfsteine der Herrschaft und des Rechts, 58 ORDO: Jahrbuch für 
die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 3, 3–5 (2007) (restating this position). 
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edifice did not give rise to much concern.
44
 When Germany, France, and the Netherlands, 
as well as others, failed to respect the rules of the Stability Pact, the Commission’s much-
vaunted efforts to take action against them dwindled into nothing. Barry Eichengreen, a 
renowned US observer of European monetary policy since the negotiations on the Treaty 
of Maastricht,
45
 commented frankly on the breach of the law: “How can one expect 
compliance with a threshold which has no sound conceptual basis?”
46
 Occasionally, he 
used even stronger language
47
 and was by no means alone in voicing such principled 
criticism.
48
 The Monetary Union was poorly designed and the enforcement of its rules 
would not prevent the damage, but increased it. 
 
Things were to become much worse during the current crisis. The Union experiences a 
state of emergency where the law is losing its integrity. The all-too-meager points of 
reference provided in Article 122(2) TFEU, amended under the simplified revision 
procedures of Article 48(6) which “shall not increase the competences conferred on the 
Union in the Treaties,”
49
 must justify incalculable solidarity payments.
50
 The European 
Central Bank is disregarding its statutes as they used to be read;
51
 parliaments are 
convened to make fast-tracked decisions that cannot be meaningfully discussed; Greece 
and other members of the Union are being told that their sovereignty is now “limited.” 
Changes of government take place under exceptional circumstances. Polanyi and his 
analyses of monetary policy are only rarely mentioned during all this. Yet, bear in mind his 
qualification of money as a fictitious commodity,
52
 and of the risks of destroying the social 
                                            
44 See Christian Joerges, What is Left of the European Economic Constitution: A Melancholic Eulogy, 30 EUR. L. REV. 
461, 465 (2005) (discussing this matter in greater detail). 
45 See Barry Eichengreen, Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved?, 74 PRINCETON STUD. IN INT’L FIN. (1992). 
46 Barry Eichengreen, Institutions for Fiscal Stability (Working Paper PEIF No. 6, 2003).  
47 See, e.g., Peter Bofinger, Are There Alternatives to the Stability Pact? Three Experts Answer, DIE ZEIT (Nov. 20, 
2003), http://www.zeit.de/2003/49/Oekonom_I (contribution of Barry Eichengreen) (“The 3% cap is at best 
ridiculous and at worst perverse.”).   
48 Giandomenico Majone, Rethinking European Integration After the Debt Crisis (UCL Working Paper No. 3, 2012), 
available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/analysis-publications/publications/WP3.pdf.  
49 Council Decision 2011/199, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 1 (amending Art. 136 TFEU with regard to a stability mechanism for 
Member States whose currency is the euro).  
50 See infra Part D.III (evaluating the Constitutional Court’s decision on Greece). The reasons provided in plaintiff 
Peter Gauweiler’s constitutional complaint by Dietrich Murswiek are available online. UNI FREIBURG: INSTITUTE FOR 
PUBLIC LAW, http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/institute/ioeffr3/forschung/gutachten. 
51 Martin Seidel, Der Euro—Schutzschild oder Falle? (ZEI Working Paper No. B01, 2010). 
52 “Money . . . is merely a token of purchasing power which, as a rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being 
through the mechanism of banking or state finance.” KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 72 (2001). See Sabine Frerichs, From Credit to Crisis: Max Weber, Karl Polanyi, and 
the Other Side of the Coin, 40 J. OF L. & SOC’Y 7–26 (2013). 
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conditions under which market societies can function.
53
 Ordo-liberal and monetarist 
standards were Europeanized in the legal constitution of the Monetary Union, although it 
was not possible to Europeanize their societal conditions for functioning that had 
developed over time. Majone explains his opinion that the central bank is a “constitutional 
monstrosity” by reasoning that the bank is supposed to pursue its stated goal of price 
stability in a political vacuum, and it is unable to take the Union’s socio-economic 
disparities into account while doing so.
54
 As Scharpf adds, the institutionalized inabilities to 
do anything other than react to instability and imbalance with intensified austerity 
programs not only threatens the well-being of European citizens, but also endangers the 
social acceptance of the Union.
55
 
 
III. Reactions 
 
The pace at which crisis summits are being held—and the drafting of more and more new 
legislation and regulatory complements—is breathtaking.
56
 It is both important and 
meritorious to record all this precisely,
57
 so that we can become aware of the tensions 
between our inherited concepts and methodological tools, and the present European 
praxis. Here, though, we must limit ourselves to a few highlights. 
 
In March and May 2010, the Commission developed the “Europe 2020 Strategy”
58
 and the 
“European Semester,”
59
 respectively. These were followed by the European Financial 
                                            
53 Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEW LEFT REV. 5 (2011). See also Wolfgang Streeck, 
MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/15: The Crisis in Context Democratic Capitalism and Its Contradictions, MAX PLANCK 
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES (2011), available at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp11-15.pdf. 
54 See Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power: The EU at Fifty, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan. 2010, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65854/giandomenico-majone/europe-as-the-would-be-world-power-the-
eu-at-fifty.  
55 Fritz W. Scharpf, MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/11: Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis, and the Preemption of 
Democracy, 5 MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES (2011). 
56 See Economic and Financial Affairs, COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-
releases/economic-and-financial-affairs?lang=en&BID=93 (updating information continuously).  
57 Suffice it here to refer to just a few examples from the torrent of literature. Christian Calliess, Perspektiven des 
Euro zwischen Solidarität und Recht—Eine rechtliche Analyse der Griechenlandhilfe und des Rettungsschirms, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPARECHTLICHE STUDIEN 213 (2011); Matthias Ruffert, The European Debt Crisis and European 
Union Law, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1777 (2011); PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS, AND TREATY REFORM 
457–517 (2013) (forthcoming, Chapter 12 on “Financial Crisis, Response, and Europe’s Future”). See also Nicole 
Scicluna, EU Constitutionalism in the Twenty-first Century: Politics and Law in Crisis (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, La Trobe University) (analyzing Europe’s present constitutional constellation, its Vefassungswirklichkeit, in 
Chapter 5). 
58 Communication from the Commission, COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010). 
59 Communication from the Commission, COM (2010) 250 final (May 12, 2010). 
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Stability Facility (EFSF) Framework Agreement
60
 in June 2010 and by the European 
Council’s “Euro Plus Pact”
61
 in March 2011. Simultaneously, upon the basis of the 
simplified revision procedures laid down in Article 48(6) TEU, the European Council also 
decided on 25 March 2011 to add a new Paragraph 3 to Article 136 TFEU, which permitted 
the establishment of a stability mechanism and the granting of financial assistance, 
effective 1 January 2013.
62
 This was followed in November 2011 by a bundle of legislative 
measures aimed at re-enforcing budgetary discipline on the part of the Member States. 
The package is supposed to go down in history under the catchy title of the “Six Pack” and 
entered into force on 13 December 2011.
63
 The high point of all this is the Treaty on 
Stability, Co-ordination and Governance (TSCG), drafted in December 2011, approved at an 
informal meeting of the European Council on 30 January 2012,
64
 and signed on 2 March 
2012 by twenty-five out of the then twenty-seven Member States. A debt brake according 
to the German model has been introduced, and will be subject to judicial review by the 
CJEU in the form of institutional borrowing, with one Member State bringing action against 
another. Support from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)—a permanent crisis 
fund—will be available only to countries in the euro area that have signed the pact. The 
TSCG has been ratified by the required number of Member States and entered into force 
on 1 January 2013. Two further Regulations submitted back in November 2011—the “Two-
Pack”—were adopted with parliamentary blessing in March 2013. They provide “for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive 
deficit of the Member States in the euro area” and “the strengthening of economic and 
budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area.”
65
 
 
There is much to scrutinize here: The legal problems, their treatment in legal scholarship, 
the analysis and interpretation of what has been established. The law-politics relationship 
is particularly challenging. Lawyers—practitioners and academics alike—have all 
                                            
60 The Framework Agreement was concluded by the ECOFIN Council and confirmed by the European Council, 
Brussels on June 17, 2010. Council Conclusion No. 2 of June 17, 2010, EUCO 13/10. 
61 Council Conclusion No. 3 of Mar. 25, 2011, Annex I, EUCO 10/11. 
62 Council Decision 2011/199, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 1 (amending Art. 136 TFEU with regard to a stability mechanism for 
Member States whose currency is the euro).  
63 Council Regulations 1173–1177/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 1; Council Directive 2011/85, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 1. 
64 See the Communication of the euro area Member States as well as the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the version of Jan. 20, 2012, available at: http://european-
council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf. 
65 See Press Release, European Parliament, Green light for economic governance “two pack” (Mar. 12, 2013), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20130312IPR06439/20130312IPR06439 _en.pdf. 
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traditionally sought to remain on good terms with political power.
66
 When it comes to 
Articles 122–126 TFEU, our discipline can apparently not resist helping political and 
institutional actors by taking the letter of the law so lightly as to run afoul of it. But just as 
legally wayward spirits will sometimes fail to finesse a fine legal point and must withdraw 
without achieving anything, jurisprudence is facing problems that seem to lie beyond the 
reach of its methodological means and conceptual potential. We are not going to re-
construct these discussions in any detail here, but merely underline three particularly 
disturbing constitutional issues which will be discussed in the following Sections 1–3. These 
are: 
 
(1) The establishment of new regimes of economic governance outside the 
institutional frameworks of the Treaties and of national constitutions, for which 
two German lawyers
67
 have coined the notion of völkerrechtliches 
Ersatzunionsrecht; the main difficulty here is that Ersatzunionsrecht legalizes 
departures from the European Treaties without their amendment. 
(2) The problem of whether the means by which these regimes have been 
established may be used to intervene into national constitutions and imposed 
upon democratically-legitimated governments which require financial support; 
with this practice, Europe’s crisis management is following international 
examples.
68
 The German Constitutional Court was confronted with the query of 
whether such practices can be employed among the Member States of the Union 
and/or are even required by Germany’s constitution; the main difficulty here is 
that unelected authorities exercise controls to which the democratic bodies of the 
state under supervision agree under enormous eternal pressures.  
(3) A third issue is often obscured as a simple matter of methodological 
interpretation. The difficulty here is that the conceptual basis for EMU is 
disregarded and replaced a new type of economic governance. If the EMU suffers 
from a design defect and the implementation of the law as it stands seems to 
                                            
66 See Michael Stolleis, Reluctance to Glance in the Mirror: The Changing Face of German Jurisprudence After 1933 
and Post-1945, in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND 
ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 1–18 (Christian Joerges & Navraj S. Ghaleigh eds., 2003) (Stolleis’ observations concern 
primarily, but by no means exclusively, Germany’s Nazi period). 
67 R. Alexander Lorz & Heiko Sauer, Ersatzunionsrecht und Grundgesetz – Verfassungsrechtliche 
Zustimmungsgrundlagen für den Fiskalpakt, den ESM-Vertrag und die Änderung des AEUV, in 65 DIE ÖFFENTLICHE 
VERWALTUNG 573–612 (2012), cited in the judgment of the German Constitutional Court of Sept. 12, 2012, infra 
note 89, at para. 257 of the German version, and para. 226 of the English version. 
68 Pertinent practices have been exercised by central banks and the IMF long before the financial crisis. They have 
been characterised as a feature of the global capital market: “The new conditionality of the global economic 
system—the requirements that need to be met for a country to become integrated into the global capital market 
— . . . facilitates the task of instituting a certain kind of monetary policy.” Saskia Sassen, De-Nationalized State 
Agendas and Privatized Norm-Making, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 51, 56 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur 
ed., 2004). 
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cause harm, can its rationale be replaced by some alternative, and who is 
empowered to decide upon such emergencies? The CJEU did not shy away from 
handing down clear answers to the queries in the Pringle case on 27 November 
2012.
69
 
 
1. Community Method v. Union Method and Ersatzunionsrecht 
 
The special feature of the European system—as Joseph H.H. Weiler explained in his 
seminal 1981 essay—is the simultaneity and balance of supranational law and inter-
governmental policy.
70
 Weiler thus characterized a precarious relationship, but certainly 
did not seek to grant the Member State governments carte blanche to suspend their 
commitments to Community (now Union) law whenever they believed that doing so would 
be irrefutable and expedient. And precisely this is the historical achievement of the 
Treaties of Rome: That they endeavored to rein in the power-political actions of the 
Weberian nation-state by legal means. The differences between different modes of 
interaction in the Union have been quite thoroughly explored.
71
 The move from arguing 
and deliberative problem-solving to bargaining and the strategic pursuit of “national” 
interests and the replacement of the old Community method in which the law provided 
institutional and procedural protection to the weaker actors make a real difference. Thanks 
to its domination by the Council, the new “Union method” faithfully mirrors the power 
asymmetries in the Union. Should the law care? Mark Dawson and Floris de Witte are 
among the few
72
 who have raised this issue.
73
 
                                            
69 Pringle v. Ireland, CJEU Case C-370/12 (Nov. 27, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/. 
70 Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, 1 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 257, 257 
(1981). 
71 Christine Reh, European Integration as Compromise: Recognition, Concessions and the Limits of Cooperation, 47 
GOV’T AND OPPOSITION 414–40 (2012). 
72 There are more, but they are rare. For another noteworthy exception with a great sensitivity for the hybrid 
nature of the Union praxis, see Edoardo Chiti & Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, The Constitutional Implications of the 
European Responses to the Financial and Public Debt Crisis, in 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 683, 685, 690 (2013). Chiti 
and Tereiro, throughout their analyses, assess what they lucidly describe through functional and normative 
yardsticks and thereby soften their critique; their conclusion is nonetheless uncompromising on this point: The 
new hybrid method “tends to set aside the role of EU institutions in exercising their respective competences 
within a democratic framework based on EU law in favour of power-based intergovernmental relations.” Id. at 
708. But this is precisely the reason why not only democracy but also the rule of law in its core transnational 
function—as we have underlined it in Part B—is at stake. 
73 Mark Dawson & Floris de Witte, Constitutional Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis, 76 MOD. L. REV. 817-844 
(2013) at 838 . They conclude that “the rise of executive control via the European Council, the increasing ease of 
making Treaty and legislative reforms without consulting smaller member states, and the creation of eternal fiscal 
rules uncontrollable by national parliaments, unable to be fully discussed and legitimated,is now in danger of 
desensitising the Union . . . .” Id.at 842.  Indeed, and it is true “that the Union’s existing response . . . does not 
bode well for the future.” Id. at 844. What remains to be explained is Europe’s apparent political inability to 
organize a legally robust response to these insights. See discussion infra. 
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It is simply amazing that it has become the rule among lawyers not to take these issues 
seriously. To be sure, the Member States of the Union have conferred their sovereignty 
only in “limited fields” and retain political autonomy where this does not occur. But they 
nonetheless remain bound by their common commitments, in particular to democracy and 
the rule of law (Article 2 TEU). This is why the sovereignty that they have retained does not 
empower them to enter into qualsiasi agreement. The Fiscal Compact requires from its 
signatories
74
 changes of fundamental constitutional importance, and the modes of their 
implementations are anything but consensual.
75
 The methodological reasons invoked in 
various modes replicate what could be observed earlier in European law, namely a resort 
to legal formalism which shields law from justifying to what extent it is used:
76
 
“Intergovernmental cooperation permits Member States to exercise reactive crisis 
management, but Union law does not provide an instrument for doing so.”
77 
“Major 
                                            
74 Least from Germany, which has in 2009 constitutionalized the Schuldenbremse in Article 109 Basic Law. 
Constitutional provisions, however, are easier to amend than multilateral treaties. 
75 Suffice it here to point to the analysis submitted by political scientist Martin Höpner and lawyer Florian Rödl, 
Illegitim und rechtswidrig: Das neue makroökonomische Regime im Euroraum, in ZBW – LEIBNIZ-
INFORMATIONSZENTRUM WIRTSCHAFT 219–21 (2012); similarly Jürgen Bast & Florian Rödl, Jenseits der Koordinierung? 
Zu den Grenzen der EU-Verträge für eine Europäische Wirtschaftsregierung, in 39 EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-
ZEITSCHRIFT 269–78 (2012). The authors demonstrate in detail that the Council’s power of surveillance in 
accordance with Article 136(1) (b) does not provide for the sanctions which the new regime establishes. Although 
the coordinating competencies in accordance with Article 121 TFEU (3) and (4) provide for reporting 
requirements on the part of the Member States as well as recommendations by the Commission, Article 121(6) 
TFEU does not permit mandatory sanctions. Indeed, the multilateral surveillance in accordance with Article 121(3) 
and (4) TFEU contains provisions for reports, recommendations, and warnings, but no security deposits (whether 
or not they bear interest) or fines. Article 121(6) is aimed at removing the right to regulate the details of the 
procedures in accordance with Article 121(3) and (4) TFEU. The assumption that the Council could reject 
recommendations from the Commission concerning surveillance only with a qualified majority—but also that 
such a shift in the institutional structure would be up for negotiation by the Member States—is untenable. This 
arrangement has created a hybrid of justice and injustice by establishing a regulatory machinery which is not 
provided for in the Union’s legal framework and is to be superimposed on the Member States’ institutions and 
political procedures. See also ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO, THE EUROPEAN TSCG AND EU LAW (2012), 
http://www.eunews.it/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/2012_09_06_Fischer-Lescano_Gutachten-kurz_Fiskalpakt_ 
060912-EN.pdf, and Lukas Oberndorfer, Der Fiskalpakt—Umgehung der ‘europäischen Verfassung’ und 
Durchbrechung demokratischer Verfahren?, in JURIDIKUM 168–81 (2012). 
76 See Christian Joerges, A New Alliance of De-Legalisation and Legal Formalism? Reflections on the Response to 
the Social Deficit of the European Integration Project, in DEMOKRATIE IN DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT. SOZIALE WELT 
SONDERBAND 18, 437–50 (Hauke Brunkhorst ed., 2009). 
77 Daniel Thym, Euro-Rettungsschirm: zwischenstaatliche Rechtskonstruktion und verfassungsgerichtliche 
Kontrolle, in 25 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 167–71 (2011); Daniel Thym, Annotation to GCC, 
Judgment of 7.9.2011, in 66 JURISTENZEITUNG 2011–15 (2011). As a student of the “Darker Legacies of Law in 
Europe,” I cannot refrain from a plea for linguistic sensitivity. It is one thing for Joseph H.H. Weiler to introduce 
“total law” as a trademark, or for Loïc Azoulai to write about “total harmonisation”; Germans must not disregard 
the connotations of such terms. The same holds true for the establishment of secondary legal regimes. Germans 
are as free as anybody else to approve such developments, but they should make it clear that they are aware of 
the shadow of Ernst Fränkel’s Doppelstaat and Franz Neumann’s Behemoth. 
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sections of the Euro rescue package” were “designed as intergovernmental macro-financial 
assistance” and “should therefore [sic] not be measured against European-law 
standards.”
78
 This move has its methodological precursors in the widely-acclaimed resort 
to the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) in the field of social policy. Its liberation from 
the straitjacket of the “Union method” and the replacement of hard law by soft law was 
explicitly targeted at the attainment of social objectives which were unattainable under 
the old regime.
79
 The present case, although, is much more dramatic. While the OMC did 
not accomplish the noble objectives that its proponents had envisaged, the resort to the 
“Union method” amounts to a deep transformation of the European constitutional 
constellation. The stakes are not only higher for this reason, but also because the 
organizers of the new modes of economic governance fail to provide any theoretical 
framework within which the means that would be employed to bring the deeply affected 
Member States “back on track” become visible and comprehensible.
80
 It is far from clear 
                                            
78 Daniel Thym, Euro-Rettungsschirm: zwischenstaatliche Rechtskonstruktion und verfassungsgerichtliche 
Kontrolle, 25 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 167–71 (2011); Daniel Thym, Annotation to GCC, 
Judgment of 7.9.2011, 66 JURISTENZEITUNG 1011, 1014 (Christian Joerges trans., 2011). This is, by now, the 
dominant position in European constitutionalism. This is a recent acquis, however. As late as 2011—and hence in 
the middle of the crisis—De Witte considered that the German constitutional court might declare the EFSF to be 
incompatible with German constitutional law and an ultra vires act in contravention of the “no-bailout” provision 
of Article 125 TFEU. Bruno de Witte, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability 
Mechanism, in EUR. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 6 (2011). This was, indeed, a widely-shared concern; see, e.g., Nikolas Busse, 
Unter Aufsicht. Nicht nur im Fall Griechenland: Die Deutsche Europapolitik wartet auf Karlsruhe, FRANKFUTER 
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (2010). Bruno de Witte has clarified his position on various occasions, particularly succinctly in 
Loïc Azoulai et al., Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on the Fiscal Compact Treaty, in EUI Working Papers 
Law No. 09, 6–8 (Anna Kocharov ed., 2012). His argument is far more sophisticated than the one cited in the text. 
But is not possible to come to terms with the TSCG simply because that Treaty states in Article 2 No. 2: “This 
Treaty shall apply in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. It shall also apply to the other 
Contracting Parties to the extent and under the conditions set out in Article 14.” In the draft circulated until 2 
March 2012, one could read: “This Treaty shall apply insofar as it is compatible with the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded and with European Union law. It shall not encroach upon the competence of the 
Union to act in the area of the economic union.” What happened to the compatibility with the Union’s primary 
law, one wonders. We must reckon with conflicts between the law of the Union as enshrined in the Treaties on 
the one hand, and the Fiscal Compact and the regulatory machinery established in response to the crisis on the 
other. The Fiscal Compact in its latest version simply assumes that, in such conflicts, it will prevail. 
79 See David M. & Luise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open 
Method of Co-ordination, 11 EUR. L. J. 343–64 (2005), and the critique in Christian Joerges, Integration Through 
De-Legalisation?, 33 EUR. L. REV. 219–312 (2008). 
80 By contrast, the proponents of the OMC relied on the well premises of deliberative polyarchy and/or 
democratic experimentalism: “In deliberative polyarchy, problem-solving depends not on harmony and 
spontaneous co-ordination, but on the permanent disequilibrium of incentives and interests imperfectly aligned, 
and on the disciplined, collaborative exploration of the resulting differences.” Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, 
Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 157, 168 (Karl-Heinz 
Ladeur ed., 2004). This is a formula which is very close to many methodological pronouncements within the 
conflicts-law approach and its plea for a proceduralisation. See supra notes 31, 33. The proponents of the latter 
approach diagnose, sadly, that conflicts-law constitutionalism has become a critic which can no longer be 
presented as a re-constructive approach. See Christian Joerges & Maria Weimer, A Crisis of Executive 
Managerialism in the EU: No Alternative?, in CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: LIBER AMICORUM FOR 
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how the new regime might accomplish what its organizers envisage and promise. 
Furthermore, the asymmetry between fully-harmonized monetary policy and nation-state 
competence in economic and fiscal policy diagnosed above remains unaffected. Above all, 
the stark socio-economic disparities—which have deepened since the Eastern 
enlargement—remain in place, as do the conflicts resulting from these disparities. As just 
underlined above, Europe’s crisis management operates without conceptual guidance. And 
this is anything but fortuitous, as this crisis management is intergovernmental and must 
hence follow the logic of finding compromises between actors with different interests, 
institutional preferences, and political perspectives.
81
 
 
2. Constitutional Guardianship I: Mutual Non-recognition of the Budgetary Power of 
National Parliaments?
82
 
 
The German Federal Constitutional Court is by no means the only forum in which Europe’s 
constitution has been tested.
83
 Yet nowhere else does this occur with such regularity, and 
although the court has, indeed, gained the reputation of a dog “that barks but does not 
bite,”
84
 the anxieties of the many publics in both the EU and elsewhere awaiting its 
decisions on the management of the financial crisis are easy to explain: This court 
supervises the economically most powerful Member State whose government underlines 
again and again how seriously it takes every judicial pronouncement. The FCC is, of course, 
well aware of all this. The mere fact that it is exposed to political scrutiny from many 
                                                                                                                
DAVID M TRUBEK (Gráínne de Búrca, Claire Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott eds., 2013). The most prominent proponents of 
OMC and democratic experimentalism see, apparently, no reason for such modesty and re-design. See Charles F. 
Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalism in the EU: Common Ground and Persistent Differences, in 6 REGULATION 
& GOVERNANCE 410–426 (2012). 
81 For a deepened analysis, see Giandomenico Majone, Rethinking European Integration After the Debt Crisis, UCL 
WORKING PAPER NO. 3, at 19 (2012), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/highlights/majone; Fritz 
W. Scharpf, Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Preemption of Democracy, MPIFG DISCUSSION PAPER 11/11, 
Cologne 2011; Fritz W. Scharpf, Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity and its Collapse in the 
Euro Crisis, MPIFG DISCUSSION PAPER 12/6, Cologne 2012. What both authors implicitly confirm is the validity of 
Polanyi’s insights in the social embeddedness of the economy. See supra notes 25–28. 
82 The following passages on the crisis jurisprudence of the GCC and the CJEU draw on Michelle Everson & 
Christian Joerges, Who is the Guardian for Constitutionalism in Europe After the Financial Crisis?, in POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: STILL DEMOCRATIC IN TIMES OF CRISIS? 400–28 (Sandra Kröger ed., 2014). 
83 See Darinka Piqani, SUPREMACY OF EU LAW AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESERVATIONS IN CENTRAL EASTERN 
EUROPE AND THE WESTERN BALKANS: TOWARDS A ‘HOLISTIC’ CONSTITUTIONALISM (June 11, 2010) (Ph.D thesis, EUI Florence), 
and Federico Fabbrini, The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in Comparative 
Perspective, BERKELEY J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2014). 
84 Joseph H.H. Weiler, The ‘Lisbon Urteil’ and the Fast Food Culture, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 505, 505 (2009), commenting 
on Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 
1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08, 2 BvR 182/09 (June 30, 2009), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ 
es20090630_2bve000208en.html [hereinafter Judgment of June 30, 2009]. 
2014] Europe’s Economic Constitution in Crisis 1005 
             
quarters and that its pronouncements are assessed politically means that it is de facto 
performing a political role. But the source of the court’s authority is its legal mandate and 
the quality of its exercise. It is not just the outcome of a litigation that matters. In this 
respect Joseph Weiler hit the nail on the head with his respectful ridicule. Indeed, how 
realistic was it to expect that the Court would help Mr. Brunner and his DM-Partei overturn 
the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993?
85
 Would Karlsruhe have been in a position to put a sad 
end to the Treaty of Lisbon, which had been negotiated with so much effort by so many 
actors over so many years?
86
 And yet, these judgments did matter. In particular, the 
significance of the Treaty of Maastricht decision, which had for the first time raised the 
previously rather staid discussion about Europe to the level of a true constitutional debate, 
and which had—albeit only indirectly—imposed Germany’s economic philosophy upon the 
rest of Europe,
87
 can hardly be overstated. 
 
Hardly anybody had serious doubts as to the outcome of the proceedings on the rescue 
package for Greece,
88
 and on the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact.
89
 What observers 
were nevertheless anxious to learn was how the FCC would perform the balancing 
between law and politics, and thereby define its own constitutional guardianship. 
 
2.1 The Rescue Package for Greece 
 
The plaintiffs in this litigation were the usual suspects: A group of professorial economists 
and Dr. Gauweiler, a member of the Bundestag, as representing the Bavarian branch of the 
Christian Democratic party (CSU). They challenged both German and European legal 
instruments as well as further measures related to attempts to solve the current financial 
and sovereign debt crisis in the area of the European monetary union.
90
 
 
                                            
85 See infra Part D.I. 
86 Judgment of June 30, 2009. 
87 See infra Part D.I. 
88 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 
BvR 1099/10 (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20110907_2bvr098710en.html 
[hereinafter Judgment of Sept. 7, 2011]. 
89 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12 (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html [English translation], 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20120912_2bvr139012.html [German] [hereinafter 
Judgment of Sept. 12, 2012]. 
90 Namely, the Währungsunion-Finanzstabilisierungsgesetz, (Monetary Union Financial Stabilisation Act), which 
grants the authorization to provide aid to Greece, and the Gesetz zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im 
Rahmen eines europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus, (Act Concerning the Giving of Guarantees in the 
Framework of a European Stabilisation Mechanism). 
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My reading of the judgment on the Greek rescue package focuses on three concerns. The 
first is the tension between the financial crisis management and the German constitution. 
In this regard, the message of the Court is strong in principle, but not so constraining in 
practice: Budgetary powers are a core responsibility of the parliament and a central 
element of democratic self-rule.
91
 This is why the Bundestag must remain “the place in 
which autonomous decisions on revenue and expenditure are made, even with regard to 
international and European commitments.”
92
 But this is where the law’s prerogatives end; 
parliament enjoys wide latitude in the exercise of its responsibilities, a political prerogative 
which the Court will respect.
93
 A second concern is the compliance with the order of 
competences. The Court recalls its famous dictum from the Maastricht Judgment: Legal 
instruments that disregard the order of competences (ausbrechende Rechtsakte) do not 
apply in Germany.
94
 But this monitum is actually soft, because it needs to be read in the 
light of the Mangold/Honeywell decision.
95
 The court refrained, though, from considering 
the request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU with a view to having the CJEU 
examine the compatibility of the rescue measure/s with Article 125 TFEU. Instead, it 
contented itself with assuring that Monetary Union was designed to be a “stability 
community” and hence is one.
96
 And we, the citizens? We cannot, in a constitutional 
democracy, be obliged to comply with European commands that exceed the competences 
conferred to the Union. Hence, we need to accept that our government takes its 
commitments to our financial interests seriously.
97
 “A crafty and blandishing wink of the 
eye,” comments Ruffert.
98
 In fact, the Court is examining only whether Germany has met 
its “integration responsibility” (Integrationsverantwortung), and then leaves the question 
unanswered of “under what conditions constitutional complaints against non-treaty 
changes of primary Union law can be based upon Article 38 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 
                                            
91 Judgment of Sept. 7, 2011 at paras. 121–23. 
92 Id. at para. 124. 
93 Id. at paras. 130–32. 
94 Id. at para. 116 (referencing the decisions on Maastricht [BVerfGE 89, 155, 175] and Honeywell [BVerfGE 126, 
286, 302 et seq.]); in the Maastricht decision, see also paras. 129 & 137 on commitment to the stability concept. 
95 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06 (July 6, 2010), 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html. 
96 Judgment of Sept. 7, 2011 at para. 129. The court adds: “In this connection, particular mention should be made 
of the prohibition of direct purchase of debt instruments of public institutions by the European Central Bank, the 
prohibition of accepting liability (bailout clause) and the stability criteria for sound budget management (Articles 
123 to 126, Article 136 TFEU).” Id. This remark attracted considerable attention but has not been taken too 
seriously by the ECB. 
97 Id. at para. 98. 
98 Mattias Ruffert, Die europäische Schuldenkrise vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht – Anmerkung zum Urteil vom 
7. September 2011, EUROPARECHT 842, 844 (2011). 
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German Basic Law.”
99
 The intergovernmental decisions were not “sovereign acts of 
German public authorities,” “notwithstanding other possibilities for legal review,” which is 
why they could not be challenged.
100
 
 
Is it adequate to consider the decision’s “lasting merit” to be the fact that it “honestly 
recognized the limits of its own substantive expertise?”
101
 Wise judicial self-restraint is 
hardly a proper reading of this rescue package judgment—certainly not if it is read in 
conjunction with the follow-up judgment of 12 September 2012. 
 
2.2 The ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact 
 
This litigation was more spectacular by far. Not only the usual plaintiffs but also the 
parliamentary group of Die Linke and no less than 37,000 citizens—among them very 
prominent figures—had filed constitutional complaints with which they primarily 
requested a temporary injunction, which would inhibit the entering into force of the 
statutes passed by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat on 29 June 2012 as measures to deal 
with the sovereign debt until the decision of the FCC in the principal proceedings. 
 
The outcome was as usual. The government, Brussels, and the market were relieved. The 
resonance in academic quarters was unusually positive. On closer inspection, though, the 
judgment turns out to be highly problematical. Its ambivalence stems, unfortunately, from 
the Court’s renewed defense of the budgetary power of the German Bundestag as a 
democratic essential. As in the previous judgment, one wonders about the de facto 
importance of this principle. Again, the Court underlined that the Bundestag enjoyed wide 
latitude which the judiciary had to respect.
102
 Through this move, the rights of the 
Bundestag were re-defined in a proceduralizing mode: The Parliament must be adequately 
informed, enabled to deliberate, and prevented from delegating its evaluation. It is far 
from clear, though, to what degree these caveats will enable the German Parliament to 
exercise effective supervision of its government and its transnational activities.
103
 Even 
more important and questionable is the Court’s complacency with the rest of the Union. In 
the pertinent passages, the Court once again strengthened the link between the 
Bundestag’s budgetary responsibility and a distinctly German philosophy of stability (e.g., 
price stability and the independence of the ECB above all).
104
 As a consequence, the nature 
                                            
99 Judgment of Sept. 7, 2011 at para. 109. 
100 Id. at para. 116. 
101 See Daniel Thym, Annotation to GCC, Judgment of 7.9.2011, 66 JURISTENZEITUNG 1015 (2011). 
102 Judgment of Sept. 12, 2012 at para. 180. 
103 See Christian Geyer, Anatomie einer Hintergehung [Anatomy of a Deceit], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, June 
21, 2012, at 29. 
104 The German version reads:  
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of the EMU as a stability community (Stabilitätsgemeinschaft) is even seen as being 
protected by the “eternity clause” of Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law as an 
unamendable core of Germany’s constitutional identity. Thus, the stability principles 
become the core of a refurbished European economic constitution.
105
 All this—the Court 
hopes—will protect the democratic rights of German citizens. Non-German citizens of the 
Union, however, should not be amused at all. Why is budgetary autonomy not understood 
as a “common” European constitutional legacy, respect for which is demanded by Article 
4(2) TEU?  
 
The one-sidedness of this argument is all the more disappointing as the Court, in an earlier 
paragraph of its judgment, had opened another and more constructive perspective: The 
Court explained that “Article 79(3) seeks to protect those structures and procedures which 
                                                                                                                
Die haushaltspolitische Gesamtverantwortung des Deutschen 
Bundestags wird in Ansehung der Übertragung der Währungshoheit 
auf das Europäische System der Zentralbanken namentlich durch die 
Unterwerfung der Europäischen Zentralbank under die strengen 
Kriterien des Vertrages über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union 
und der Satzung des Europäischen Systems der Zentralbanken 
hinsichtlich der Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank und die Priorität der 
Geldwertstabilität gesichert. Ein wesentliches Element zur 
unionsrechtlichen Absicherung der verfassungsrechtlichen 
Anforderungen aus Art. 20 Abs. 1 und Abs. 2 in Verbindung mit Art. 
79 Abs. 3 GG ist insoweit das Verbtot monetärer 
Haushaltsfinanzierung durch die Europäische Zentralbank. 
Judgment of Sept. 12, 2012 at para. 116. Paragraph 220 in the English translation reads:  
In view of the transfer of monetary sovereignty to the European 
System of Central Banks, the German Bundestag’s overall budgetary 
responsibility is safeguarded particularly by the fact that the 
European Central Bank subjects itself to the strict criteria of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and of the Statute 
of the European System of Central Banks with regard to the 
independence of the Central Bank and to the priority of monetary 
stability (see BVerfGE 89, 155 <204-205, 207 et seq.>; 129, 124 <181-
182>). In this context, an essential element of safeguarding the 
constitutional requirements resulting from Article 20(1) and (2) in 
conjunction with Article 79(3) of the Basic Law in European Union 
Law is the prohibition of monetary financing by the European Central 
Bank (see BVerfGE 89, 155 <204-205>; 129, 124 <181-182>).  
Id. at para 220. Paragraph 170 is not yet translated. The German original reads: “Da der Bundestag durch seine 
Zustimmung zu Stabilitätshilfen den verfassungsrechtlich gebotenen Einfluss ausüben und Höhe, Konditionalität 
und Dauer der Stabilitätshilfen zugunsten hilfesuchender Mitgliedstaaten mitbestimmen kann, legt er selbst die 
wichtigste Grundlage für später möglicherweise erfolgende Kapitalabrufe nach Art. 9 Abs. 2 ESMV.” Id. at para. 
170. 
105 See id. paras. 219–20, 232–33, 239–79, 300–19. 
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keep the democratic process open.”
106
 The Court did not indicate that it would be 
prepared to address the tensions between democratic commitments and the integration 
process, which would include the concerns of all the Member States. Instead, the Court’s 
reasoning leads to a strengthening of the links between economic stability and social 
austerity. This form of judicial self-restraint seems even more questionable in the light of—
or rather, in the shadow of—the Maastricht Judgment discussed above.
107
 Once again, the 
FCC imposes German views on the rest of Europe, albeit in a significantly modified move. 
While the Maastricht judgment assumed that Europe’s economic constitution could be an 
essentially legal project, the new judgment is moving from law to governmental and 
executive managerialism, with requirements defined mainly by Germany and its Northern 
allies. To put it slightly differently, we find it deplorable that the FCC acted as (only) the 
guardian of the German constitution. The qualification of financial assistance as a matter 
not of European monetary but of national economic policy,
108
 as well as the somewhat 
euphemistic statements on the respect of the stability commitments,
109
 are anything but 
robust indicators of truly European commitments. They are embedded in the conditionality 
of existing crisis management. The FCC talks about democratic essentials—Jürgen 
Habermas has observed—but has Germany in mind.
110
 The one-sidedness of its decision 
seems, indeed, obvious—and difficult to overcome. The German Court is not entitled to act 
as the Guardian of Europe. What we would expect, although, is a readiness to define 
Germany as a Member of a Union in which the concerns of all the Member States and their 
democratic rights deserve recognition. Only then would the Court document an 
understanding, or Integrationsverantwortung, which might reflect common European 
commitments.
111
 
 
3. Constitutional Guardianship II: The Methodological Failures of the CJEU in the Pringle 
Case 
 
Thomas Pringle, Member of the Irish Parliament, raised a series of objections against the 
involvement of his government in the ESM Treaty. Of particular interest in the present 
context is his assertion that the ESM constitutes an autonomous and permanent 
international institution, designed to evade restrictive provisions in the TFEU in relation to 
                                            
106 Id. at para. 206 in the English extract, para. 222 in the German original. 
107 See supra Part F.I. 
108 Judgment of Sept. 12, 2012 at para 169 [English version]. 
109 Id. at paras. 201. 
110 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, DREI GRÜNDE FÜR ‘MEHR EUROPA’ [Three Reasons for “More Europe”] (2012), reprinted in JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, IM SOG DER TECHNOKRATIE 132–37 (2013). 
111 For a similar critique, see Henning Deters, National Constitutional Jurisprudence in a Post-National Europe: The 
ESM Ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 20 EUR. L. J. 204–20 (2014). 
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economic and monetary policy, and amounts to a usurpation of competences which were 
not conferred to the Union. This argument concerns the transformation of the European 
economic constitution through Ersatzunionsrecht which we have discussed in section III 
above. It is intrinsically linked to Pringle’s concern with the rule of law. He argued the new 
regime has suspended the principle of legal protection. His complaint was rejected in the 
first instance, but, on appeal, the Irish Supreme Court, in a judgment of 17 July 2012,
112
 
decided to stay proceeding and submit a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU. The 
CJEU (Full Court) handed down its judgment on 27 November 2012.
113
 
 
The argument upon which the following analysis focuses is based upon the Court’s reading 
of the bailout prohibition of Article 125 TFEU, and the emergency exception in Article 
122(2) TFEU, through which the unrestrained new mode of economic governance is 
justified; these are key provisions of the economic constitution established under the 
Treaty of Maastricht and their re-vision through the judiciary is, hence, about the 
structuring of a new constitutional constellation. The reasons for this transformation have 
been addressed throughout the previous sections. It has, by now, become a communis 
opinio that European monetary policy—with its pre-defined objectives and institutional 
frameworks—cannot operate in tandem with the multitude of national actors that are 
pursuing economic and fiscal policies under a very loosely-constructed machinery of 
European supervision. The message of the Pringle judgment is in line with that which we 
have observed thus far; the failures of the past justify the efforts of Europe’s crisis 
management which can, therefore, be legalized. The Court’s attitude is certainly 
understandable; its reasoning, however, suffers from serious flaws. 
 
The main flaw is the Court’s failure to address the implications of its own explanation of 
the conceptual background to the “no-bailout” clause:  
 
The prohibition laid down in Article 125 TFEU 
ensures that the Member States remain subject to 
the logic of the market when they enter into debt, 
since that ought to prompt them to maintain 
budgetary discipline. Compliance with such discipline 
contributes, at Union level, to the attainment of a 
higher objective, namely, maintaining the financial 
stability of the monetary union.
114
  
 
                                            
112 Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at para. 135. 
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This is, indeed, a fair re-statement of an ordo-liberal legacy that we can still identify within 
the Maastricht EMU. Except, the Court is then silent with regard to the philosophy 
underlying our current cure to the failures of the past. This is by no means to suggest that 
the Court should have advocated an ordo-liberal renaissance. Nonetheless, what truly 
disappoints in its presentation of the new modes of economic governance is the lack of any 
kind of conceptual deliberation about their background and their adequacy. As we have 
argued in Section III, the new modes of European economic governance amount to nothing 
less than a deep transformation of the state of the European Union. To put it slightly 
differently: Is the CJEU legitimated to depart from the law as it stands and to replace it 
with a new regime? 
 
The Court finds an easy answer: 
 
Since Article 122(1) TFEU does not constitute an 
appropriate legal basis for any financial assistance from 
the Union to Member States who [sic] are 
experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing 
problems, the establishment of a stability mechanism 
such as the ESM does not encroach on the powers 
which that provision confers on the Council.
115
 
 
This is, in itself, a daring assumption. But precisely if one subscribes to the “bicycle theory” 
of Europe, and concedes that the constant re-writing of its law is an irrefutable 
necessity,
116
 that one must, all the more, insist both upon an explanation of the new 
objectives and deliberation on the adequacy of the means which they are employing. 
 
Prior to the Pringle judgment, Kaarlo Tuori had developed a transformative theory, which 
sought to anchor the disregard of the economic philosophy underlying the EMU in a 
“second order telos:”
117
 
 
[A] teleological interpretation should heed not only the 
particular telos of the no-bailout clause but also the 
more general objective of the regulative whole Article 
125(1) is part of. And this ‘second-order’ telos of the 
no-bailout clause undoubtedly includes the financial 
                                            
115 Id. at 116. 
116 See supra note 22, Part C with the reference to Hans Peter Ipsen. 
117 See, on the defence of the CJEU, Paul Craig, Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology, 20 
MAASTRICHT J. OF COMP. & EUR. L. 3-11, 10 (2013). Craig characterises the Court’s reasoning on Art. 15 as “tenuous” 
and then uses the two authors cited in the text to strengthen the judicial argumentation whereas I feel that they 
reveal its weaknesses further. Id. at 8. 
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stability of the euro area as a whole. This argument 
supports the legal impeccability of Member-State 
assistance, in spite of the no-bailout clause and the 
inapplicability of the emergency provision in Article 
122(2) TFEU. But it also justifies and even presupposes, 
at least to a certain extent, the ‘strict conditionality’ of 
assistance.
118
 
 
Tuori’s argument can be read as a search for rationality, an effort to shield the law, its 
production, and its application against its replacement by pure politics. His argument was 
not available to the Court, and the Pringle judgment was obviously not available when 
Tuori developed it. It is all the more illuminating that the core of his telos theory is present 
in the judgment; in the paragraph already cited, the court invokes “the logic of the market” 
as the rationale of the new regime, and underlines that it is precisely this logic which 
requires strict conditionality.
119
 
 
In an essay seeking to understand and explain what makes resorting to topoi and theorems 
from economics so attractive for legal scholarship, jurisprudence, and the judiciary in 
transnational constellations in which the modes of legitimation as we know them from 
constitutional democracies are not available, Michelle Everson has deciphered the 
“processes by which law has transformed itself into an economic technology.”
120
 The 
Pringle judgment provides a stunning illustration of her analysis. There is no sinister 
conspiracy at work in the argumentation of the court and its supporters, but a serious and 
desperate effort to defend the law’s proprium. The tragedy of all these moves remains that 
“the logic of the market” fails to deliver the kind of objective orientation which the lawyers 
hope for. The clearest and, at the same time, most disquieting confirmation of that 
dilemma can be read in Advocate General Kokott’s view: 
 
Given the mutual interdependence of the Member 
States’ individual economic activities which is 
encouraged and intended under European Union law, 
substantial damage could be caused by the bankruptcy 
of one Member State to other Member States also. 
That damage might possibly be so extensive that an 
                                            
118 Kaarlo Heikki Tuori, The European Financial Crisis – Constitutional Aspects and Implications, in EUI WORKING 
PAPER LAW 2012/28, 34 (Nov. 1, 2012). 
119 “[T]he activation of financial assistance by means of a stability mechanism such as the ESM is not compatible 
with Article 125 TFEU unless it is indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro area as a 
whole and subject to strict conditions,” Pringle v. Ireland, CJEU Case C-370/12, 2012 E.C.R. I-000, para. 135. 
120 Michelle Everson, The Fault of (European) Law in (Political and Social) Economic Crisis, 24 L. & CRITIQUE 107 
(2013). 
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additional consequence would be to endanger the 
survival of monetary union, as submitted by a number 
of parties to the proceedings. 
 
There is no question here of finding that such a danger 
to the stability of the monetary union exists or of 
examining how such a danger should best be 
combated. It must only be emphasized that a broad 
interpretation of Article 125 TFEU would, also in such 
circumstances, deprive the Member States of the 
power to avert the bankruptcy of another Member 
State and of the ability thereby to attempt to avert 
damage to themselves. In my opinion, such an 
extensive restriction on the sovereignty of the Member 
States to adopt measures for their own protection 
cannot be founded on a broad teleological 
interpretation of a legal provision the wording of which 
does not unambiguously state that restriction.
121
 
 
The rescue measures are political decisions; they need no legal justification: auctoritas, 
non veritas, facit legem. The replacement of law by discretionary political fiat is 
Schmittianism pure. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the deeply undemocratic nature of 
conditionality goes unnoticed or fails to be commented upon. 
 
3.1 An Interim Conclusion 
 
What would have happened to the European Union had its Court of Justice found: That 
Thomas Pringle’s concerns about Europe’s crisis management were well-founded; that the 
support mechanisms which the EFSF and the ESM have established interfere with the 
exclusive European competence for monetary policy; that the amendment of Article 136 
TFEU was not possible under the simplified revision procedure enshrined in Article 48(6) 
TEU; that new policies being adopted and pursued by the Member States jeopardized the 
primacy of price stability; that the bail-out provision of Article 125 TFEU prohibited the 
granting of financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the Euro; that the 
functions assumed by the Commission, the ECB, and the IWF were irreconcilable with the 
principles on the conferral of powers laid down in Article 13 TFEU; or that the mandate 
allocated to the CJEU in the ESM Treaty exceeded judicial powers? It is simply impossible 
to predict the dire consequences. 
 
                                            
121 View of Advocate General Kokott at paras. 139-140; Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12. 
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It is equally difficult to determine what the judgment has accomplished, both in terms of 
its contribution to the taming of the crisis, and its effect on Europe’s constitutional 
constellation and the role of law. The situation of the FCC is not much different. The Court 
could not clarify the factual uncertainties of the financial crisis, and no normative guidance 
was available to help the Court assess the risks of partisanship for or against the European 
praxis. The German court decided to (re-)delegate responsibility for present and future 
consequences to the political process. The European court elected to prioritize textual 
formalism over conceptual reasoning—as though Ernst Steindorff never wrote about the 
politics of law,
122
 and without justifying its departure from the type of teleological 
interpretation on which it tends to rely so heavily.
123
 These are but methodological 
shortcomings. The substantive theoretical default of both courts is their disregard for 
Europe’s commitments to democracy and the rule of law. This unfortunate complacency is 
inherent in the politics of conditionality to which both courts subscribe.
 124
 To rephrase this 
critique: Do these courts and the academics supporting them “place a thin veneer of 
legality on the political which allows the executive to do what it wants?”
125
 Do they 
consciously, or at least implicitly, reconstruct the contemporary conditions in which 
political guidance and rule are provided by the executive, rather than representative 
institutions, and in which law can no longer be understood as a body of rules, but must 
instead content itself with providing standards which are sufficiently vague to empower 
policymakers to act according to their understanding of what needs to be done?
126
 
 
                                            
122 Ernst Steindorff, Politik des Gesetzes als Auslegungsmaßstab im Wirtschaftsrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT KARL LARENZ 217 
(1973); Ernst Steindorff, Wirtschaftsordnung und Steuerung durch Privatrecht?, in FESTSCHRIFT LUDWIG RAISER 621 
(1974). 
123 See generally GUNNAR BECK, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU (2012). 
124 See Michael Ioannidis, EU Financial Assistance Conditionality after “Two Pack”, 74 HEIDELBERG JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (ZAÖRV) (forthcoming  2014); Michelle Everson, An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the 
Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, in 136 POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES (Institute for Advanced Studies, 
Vienna 2014), http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_136.pdf; 
[C]onditionality irrevocably undermines the status of the Member 
States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’ … Just as the Federal Government 
within Germany respects the democratic integrity of the Länder 
which make up the federal state, the Federal Republic of Germany 
cannot, in its relations within the European Union, contract with 
‘slaves’. It cannot enter into partnership with anything other than 
fully sovereign states. 
Id. at 30. 
125 DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 103 (2006). 
126 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have underlined that they seek to reconstruct Schmitt’s work in “generizable 
social-scientific terms”; see Demystifying Schmitt, (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 10-47, 2010, Univ. of 
Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 333, 2010) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723191. 
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At this point, the critique must reflect upon its own premises, particularly its assumption 
that the integrity of law could have been defended. It is precisely this speculation which 
may be overly simplistic and naïve. But how can this be determined? Perhaps it would be 
best to step back and observe these issues from a more removed perspective. 
 
E. A Fictitious Debate between Carl Schmitt and Jürgen Habermas 
 
Europe’s financial crisis is not an expression of a faulty way of dealing with prevailing law, 
but an expression of the imperfection of Europe’s legal design—including its configuration 
of the law-politics relationship. A rare, albeit superficial, consensus has emerged regarding 
this critical evaluation. Beyond this consensus, the crisis has generated challenges for all 
disciplines engaged in European studies. This is why it would be presumptuous to venture 
legal and constitutional policy hypotheses here based upon some definite assessment as to 
the causes of the crisis, as well as forecasts regarding its further course, intending to 
provide a blueprint for Europe’s future constitutional architecture. The following 
deliberations will examine these ongoing contestations from a distance, in the form of a 
fictitious debate between Carl Schmitt and Jürgen Habermas. Considering these names, it 
may be appropriate to begin by stating positions.
127
 My personal theoretical home is the 
discourse theory of law, both in German and European law.
128
 It is for an adherent of the 
Habermasian theory of law and democracy all the more disturbing that Carl Schmitt seems 
to have gained alarming topicality, not only with his concept of the state of exception and 
his theorem of a commissarial dictatorship, but also with his theory of the Großraum and 
the diagnosis concerning the “hour of the executive.” 
 
I. Carl Schmitt’s Shadow over Europe 
 
In view of the European dimension of the financial crisis, it seems best to begin with the 
theory of the Großraum, a notion which was explicitly, albeit not exclusively designed to 
capture the European constellation Carl Schmitt selected a memorable occasion to present 
it: From 29 March 1939 to 1 April 1939, still half a year before the war against Poland, but 
after the Anschluss of Austria and the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia (the Sudetenland) 
                                            
127 An explanatory follow-up to the remarks on Ersatzunionsrecht in Part III.1 above may be in place here. For 
obvious reasons, Germans are particularly concerned about the lasting impact of Schmitt and another “hour of 
the executive.” This is by no means to say that the search for administrative legitimacy of European rule as 
pursued by Peter L. Lindseth (see the references to his work in footnote 143 and his recent Equilibrium, Demoi-
cracy, and Delegation in the Crisis of European Integration, 15 GERMAN L.J. (2014) or by Deirdre Curtin (see her 
Chorley Lecture on The Challenge of Executive Democracy in Europe, 77 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1-32 (2014) would operate 
in the shadow of that legacy.. 
128 See Christian Joerges, The Science of Private Law and the Nation-State 47-82 (Florence: European University 
Institute, Law Department, Working Paper No. 98/4, 1998); Christian Joerges, Reflections on Habermas’ 
Postnational Constellation, in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, VOL. 2 XI-XXI (Camil Ungureanu, Klaus Guenther & Christian 
Joerges eds., 2011). 
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at the Reichsgruppe Hochschullehrer des Nationalsozialistischen Rechtswahrer-Bundes 
(Reich section of professors in the National Socialist Association of Lawyers) convened in 
Kiel. Also during this time period, the Institute for Politics und International Law was 
celebrating its 25th anniversary. Thus, Carl Schmitt gave his lecture entitled 
“Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte. Ein 
Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht” (The Großraum Order of International Law with 
a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich 
in International Law) amidst this momentous setting.
129
 
 
The core argument of Schmitt’s key note was that the jus publicum europaeum, which had 
made the sovereign state its central concept, was no longer in line with the de facto spatial 
order of Europe.
130
 Following the model of the Monroe Doctrine, a specific “space” (the 
Raum) had to become the conceptual basis for international law, with the Reich 
constituting the order of that space. To quote directly: “The new ordering concept for a 
new international law is our concept of the Reich, with its Volk-based, völkisch Großraum 
order.” But what does this mean for the internal order of the Großraum? Schmitt refers to 
the elasticity of the concept of international law, which could also cover the inter-völkische 
relations within a Großraum as well. What the Großraum requires and constitutes is an 
“order that excludes the possibility of intervention on the part of spatially foreign powers 
and whose guarantor and guardian is a nation that shows itself to be up to this task.”
131
 
 
This claim to leadership was, in Schmitt’s words, “situational,”
132
 and the overall notion of 
the Großraum, as he underlined in discussions with his Nazi contemporaries, rivals, and 
                                            
129 The lecture was published as early as April 1939 in the Institute’s series; its 4th edition of 1941 refers to 
translations into five languages. The quotations in the following are either our own translations of the extremely 
carefully annotated reprint in GÜNTER MASCHKE, CARL SCHMITT, STAAT, GROßRAUM, NOMOS. ARBEITEN AUS DEN JAHREN 
1916-1969 269-320 (1995) or, as the title reproduced in this text, CARL SCHMITT, WRITINGS ON WAR 75-124 (Timothy 
Nunan ed. & trans., 2011). 
130 For more detail on the following, see Christian Joerges, Europe a Großraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisations 
of the Integration Project, in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER 
EUROPE AND ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 167-191 (Christian Joerges & Navraj S. Ghaleigh eds., 2003). 
131 See CARL SCHMITT, WRITINGS ON WAR 110 (Timothy Nunan ed. and trans., 2011). Contemporary reactions attested 
to how the theory of the Großraum with its “German Monroe doctrine” suited Nazi policy; for this reason, the 
theory is considered Schmitt’s way of indicating his return as a leading legal thinker; see LOTHAR GRUCHMANN, 
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE GROßRAUMORDNUNG. DIE KONSTRUKTION EINER “DEUTSCHEN MONROE-DOKTRIN” 11 (1962); WILLIAM 
E. SCHEUERMAN & CARL SCHMITT: THE END OF LAW 161, 169 (1965). 
132 On the theoretical understanding, but also the determination with which Schmitt championed this claim of 
leadership, lucidly HASSO HOFMANN, LEGITIMITÄT GEGEN LEGALITÄT. DER WEG DER POLITISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE CARL SCHMITTS 
215 (1992); later Oliver Eberl, Großraum und Imperium. Die Entwicklung der ‘Völkerrechtlichen 
Großraumordnung’ aus dem Geiste des totalen Krieges, in GROßRAUM-DENKEN. CARL SCHMITTS KATEGORIE DER 
GROßRAUMORDNUNG 185-206 (Rüdiger Voigt ed., 2008). More complacently, in contrast, see Horst Dreier’s 
appreciation in Wirtschaftsraum – Großraum – Lebensraum. Facetten eines belasteten Begriffs, in FESTSCHRIFT 600 
JAHRE WÜRZBURGER JURISTENFAKULTÄT 47, 66-73 (Horst Dreier, Hans Forkel & Klaus Laubenthal eds., 2002). 
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critics, was a “concrete, historical and politically contemporary concept” (konkreter 
geschichtlich-politischer Gegenwartsbegriff).
133
 But in so doing, he emphasized elements 
which he claimed to be valid long-term. The obviousness of the Großraum concept, he 
argued, resulted from transformations dominated by technical, industrial, and economic 
developments. Thus, Schmitt outlined, albeit somewhat apocryphally, an erosion of the 
territorial state as the harbinger of the necessity to adapt international law to the factual 
re-structuring of international relations and the replacement of classical international law 
by norm systems which, today, would affirmatively be called “governance structures,” or, 
distanced and critically, “managerialism.”
134
 He underlined two phenomena in particular, 
namely, the economic interdependencies beyond state frontiers (Großraumwirtschaft), 
and the specific dynamics of technology-driven developments (“technicity” 
[Technizität]).
135
 Schmitt had already published on both topics prior to 1933.
136
 
 
Schmitt was silent on the internal “order” of the Großraum during the years of war. In the 
1941 edition of the Großraum, he remained sibylline
137
 and only published his famous 
“Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum” in 1950, which he had 
written prior to 1945.
138
 But the topic continued to haunt him.
139
 When considering 
Schmitt’s theories within the context of the financial crisis, not only must his diagnoses of 
the loss of nation states’ sovereignty and the de-legalization of their relationships be taken 
                                            
133 Schmitt, supra note 131, at 107. 
134 Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law and 
Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 9, 16 (2007); Martti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International 
Relations as New Natural Law, 15 EURO. J. OF INT’L REL. 395, 411 (2009). 
135 Schmitt, supra note 131, at 111; see JOHN P. MCCORMICK, CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM. AGAINST POLITICS AS 
TECHNOLOGY 42-46, 92-105 (1997) (noting the technicity). 
136 Infamous and important, Carl Schmitt, Starker Staat und gesunde Wirtschaft. Ein Vortrag vor 
Wirtschaftsführern (delivered on Nov. 23, 1932), 2 VOLK UND REICH 81-94 (1933). 
137 The preliminary remarks to the 4th edition (Berlin 1941) include the famous motto: “We are like mariners on a 
continuing journey, and no book can be more than a log book.” 
138 CARL SCHMITT, DER NOMOS DER ERDE IM VÖLKERRECHT DES JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (1950); CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS 
OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (G.L. Ulmen trans., Telos Press 2003). 
139 Carl Schmitt, Die legale Weltrevolution. Politischer Mehrwert als Prämie auf juristische Legalität und 
Superlegalität, in 17 DER STAAT 321-339 (1978). In this tribute to the French economic theorist François Perroux, 
who examined apparently related economic dimensions of space, we read at 328: 
Today, the issue is about the political system for society adequate in 
relation to scientific-technical-industrial developments. Today, the 
adage cujus industria, ejus regio or cujus regio, ejus industria applies”, 
and on the following page Schmitt went on: “The industrialised 
society is bound to rationalisation, including the transformation of 
law into legality. 
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seriously. His observations on the increase of executive power—broadly supported by 
comparative legal research—must also be taken into account.
140
 But here, above all, we 
are concerned with his theorems of the state of emergency
141
 and the (commissarial) 
dictatorship.
142
 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde was the first to take up the term “state of 
emergency,”
143
 and others followed. “The European Stability Mechanism,” writes Ulrich 
Hufeld, has “the format of a constitution-breaching measure along the lines of Carl 
Schmitt’s conceptualization of contrasts,”
144
 and adds a quotation from Schmitt’s 1928 
Constitutional Theory: 
 
Such breakout entities are, by nature, measures, not 
norms . . . . Their necessity arises from the particular 
circumstances of an individual case, an unexpected 
abnormal situation. If, in the interest of the whole, such 
renegade entities are formed, the superiority of the 
existential over mere normativity is apparent. Whoever 
authorised such acts and is capable of acting, is 
sovereign.
145
 
 
In a tone of urgency, Frank Schorkopf
 
calls the calamity that we are dealing with a “crisis 
without an alternative”;
146
 a constellation in which the actors, including the governments 
                                            
140 Carl Schmitt, Vergleichender Überblick über die neueste Entwicklung des Problems gesetzgeberischer 
Ermächtigungen (legislative Delegationen), 6 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 252-
288 (1938); on this, of course under the impression of the American understanding of the executive, see PETER L. 
LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE NATION-STATE 62 (2010). Lindseth has underlined the 
importance and topicality of this aspect of Schmitt’s work already in his essay, Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of 
Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s–1950s, 113 
YALE L.J., 1343, 1354, 1382 (2004). 
141 JOHN P. MCCORMICK, CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM. AGAINST POLITICS AS TECHNOLOGY 122–156 (1997); Ellen 
Kennedy, Emergency Government Within the Bounds of the Constitution: An Introduction to Carl Schmitt, ‘The 
Dictatorship of the Reich president according to Article 48 R.V.,’ 18 CONSTELLATIONS 284–297 (2011). 
142 CARL SCHMITT, DIE DIKTATUR. VON DEN ANFÄNGEN DES MODERNEN SOUVERÄNITÄTSGEDANKENS BIS ZUM PROLETARISCHEN 
KLASSENKAMPF [1921] (1989). As examples of the copious literature compare the explanations in HASSO HOFMANN, 
LEGITIMITÄT GEGEN LEGALITÄT. DER WEG DER POLITISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE CARL SCHMITTS (1992). 
143 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Kennt die europäische Not kein Gebot? Die Webfehler der EU und die 
Notwendigkeit einer neuen politischen Entscheidung, NEUE ZÜRICHER ZEITUNG, June 21, 2010; also Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde , Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, in 67 JURISTENZEITUNG 197 (2012). 
144 Ulrich Hufeld, Zwischen Notrettung und Rütlischwur: der Umbau der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion in der 
Krise, 34 INTEGRATION 117, 122 (2011). 
145 CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 107 (1928) (this author’s translation, 2010). 
146 Frank Schorkopf, Gestaltung mit Recht – Prägekraft und Selbststand des Rechts in einer Rechtsgemeinschaft, 
136 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 136, 323, 341 (2011); Frank Schorkopf, Finanzkrisen als Herausforderung der 
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and the executive branches, “merely have power within the existing conditions, but not 
over them.”
147
 Anna-Bettina Kaiser arrives at her position following a precise 
reconstruction of the debates around Article 48(2) of the Weimar Constitution.
148
 The 
handling of this provision and the extensive interpretation of Article 122(2) TFEU today are 
in her view equally dubious and can be placed at the same level.
149
 Furthermore, the rules 
laid down in the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack, and the TSCG must not be sugar-coated.
150
 Yet, is 
the academic community fulfilling its responsibility by merely accepting that the provisions 
of the EMU are dysfunctional, and abstracting from the dilemma of the political in the EU? 
 
We cannot escape from Carl Schmitt’s shadow that easily. The concept of “commissarial 
dictatorship” is most plausible to except to. After all, in the current management of the 
crisis, the actors are not alone. They must not only come to an arrangement at a 
supranational level, but also between the levels of the multilevel governance system, as 
well as internationally—the dictator has been replaced by technicity. But how comforting 
is this? The fact remains that the new form of European government collides with 
democratically-legitimized institutions and processes. Thus, it is anything but comforting 
that the new European practice coincides with ideas of prominent American 
constitutionalists who draw upon Carl Schmitt in order to turn away from James Madison 
and argue the case for a plebiscitary democracy in place of a representative one; theorists 
who advocate delegating political power to the executive in case of need.
151
 And are we, 
                                                                                                                
internationalen, europäischen und nationalen Rechtssetzung, 71 VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER 
DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 183 (2012). 
147 Id. at 225. 
148 Anna-Bettina Kaiser, Die Verantwortung der Staatsrechtslehre in Krisenzeiten – Art. 48 WRV im Spiegel der 
Staatsrechtslehrertagung und des Deutschen Juristentages 1924, in ZUR AKTUALITÄT DER WEIMARER STAATSRECHTSLEHRE 
119–142 (Ulrich Jan Schröder & Antje V. Ungern-Sternberg eds., 2011). 
149 Id. at 140. 
150 See supra Parts D.III & D.IV. 
151 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND. AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 8 (2010): “When 
emergencies occur, legislatures acting under real constraints of time, expertise, and institutional energy typically 
face the choice between doing nothing at all or delegating new powers to the executive to manage the crisis.” 
This book is riddled with such pronouncements; on this, see NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: OPINION, TRUTH, 
AND THE PEOPLE 171–227 (2012); for a critical discussion of the empirical dimensions and claims of The Executive 
Unbound, see Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777 (2012). In an earlier 
essay, Posner and Vermeule have underlined that they seek to re-construct Schmitt’s work in “generizable social-
scientific terms”; see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 126. I am by no means the only one to underline, and to 
relativize, the topicality of Schmittian notions in the present state of the European project: “Without a modicum 
of legitimacy derived from any European treaties, the austerity dictates of the Troika (comprised of the EU, the 
ECB, and the IMF) have insinuated themselves as the sovereign acts in the distinctly Schmittian sense of the term, 
i.e., as extra-legal decisions on the exception.” Id. Thus, Michael Marder, Carl Schmitt and the De-
Constitutionalisation of Europe, contribution to Conference on “Europe after the Euro-crisis: Legitimacy, 
Democracy and Justice, organised by the Institute for Democratic Governance, Bilbao, September 2–3, 2013 (ms. 
on file with the author). 
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perhaps, exchanging Scylla for Charybdis? Anyone who observes the busy activities of the 
Commission’s Services—their tireless production of additional lists of criteria for ever-more 
policy fields, in ever-more regions—will remember Carl Schmitt’s words about the “total,” 
but by no means “strong” state, which he linked with a polemic against all technocratic 
efforts that believe they can decide “all issues according to technical and economic expert 
knowledge following supposedly purely substantive, purely technical and purely economic 
considerations.”
152
 Ironically, Schmitt’s late essay,
153
 quoted above, provides a situational, 
theoretical interpretation of this. Reading Hans Peter Ipsen’s 1,000-page tome on 
European law, Schmitt confessed, he was “stricken with deep sorrow,” for the following 
reason: the approach of European law, which “legalizes” a technocratic-functional 
administration of European associations, has no concept of a “legitimate political” 
project.
154
 Therefore, one cannot speak of the rule of law (Rechtsstaatlichkeit), much less 
of democracy. Now, one must take into account what Rechtsstaatlichkeit
155
 and 
democracy meant to Schmitt. In Constitutional Theory, he writes that democracy “is a state 
form that is consistent with the principle of identity (e.g., of the concretely existing people 
identified with itself as a political unit)”—and consequently, it cannot apply to an ethnically 
diverse Europe.
156
 After all this, Jürgen Habermas’ reply is all the more important.
157
 
 
                                            
152 Carl Schmitt, Die Wendung zum totalen Staat (The turn to the total state), reprinted in CARL SCHMITT: POSITIONEN 
UND BEGRIFFE IM KAMPF MIT WEIMAR-GENF-VERSAILLES, 1923-1939, 146–153 (1988) (quoted according the the reprint). 
On this see also CARL SCHMITT, DER HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG 78 (1969); on this WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL SCHMITT: THE 
END OF LAW 85 (1965). 
153 Carl Schmitt, Die legale Weltrevolution. Politischer Mehrwert als Prämie auf juristische Legalität und 
Superlegalität, 17 DER STAAT 335 (1978). 
154 Italics are use for German terms and a book title Italics added. On the recourse to the duality of legality and 
legitimacy in the present context, see Reinhard Mehring, Der ‘Nomos’ nach 1945 bei Carl Schmitt und Jürgen 
Habermas, in FORUM HISTORIAE IURIS, paras. 20–26. 
155 On the theory of the Rechtsstaat, see INGEBORG MAUS, RECHTSTHEORIE UND POLITISCHE THEORIE IM 
INDUSTRIEKAPITALISMUS 40 (1986). Schmitt’s differentiation of the categories of “formal” and “political” concepts of 
law and legislation, see CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 143 (1928) (reprinted in 2010), between the generality of 
laws and the concrete political act of will, leads him to executive and governmental law-making in the Carl 
Schmitt, Vergleichender Überblick über die neueste Entwicklung des Problems gesetzgeberischer Ermächtigungen 
(legislative Delegationen), 6 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 252 (1938); see HASSO 
HOFMANN, LEGITIMITÄT GEGEN LEGALITÄT. DER WEG DER POLITISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE CARL SCHMITTS 83 (1992). 
156 CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 223 (1928) (reprinted in 2010); see Ulrich K. Preuß, Die Weimarer Republik – ein 
Laboratorium für neues verfassungsrechtliches Denken, in METAMORPHOSEN DES POLITISCHEN: GRUNDFRAGEN 
POLITISCHER EINHEITSBILDUNG SEIT DEN 20ER JAHREN 177, 180. (Andreas Göbel ed., 1995). 
157 This exploration is no contribution to the les-extrêmes-se-touchent debate around the relationship of 
Habermas to Schmitt [for an attempt to update it, see Ernst Vollrath, Proteus und Medusa. Die politische 
Apperzeption der deutschen Staatsrechtslehre im Werk von Jürgen Habermas, 37 POLITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 
197 (1996); see also Reinhard Mehring, Der ‘Nomos’ nach 1945 bei Carl Schmitt und Jürgen Habermas, in FORUM 
HISTORIAE IURIS, para. 26. 
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II. The Crisis as Opportunity According to Jürgen Habermas 
 
In view of the crisis, Jürgen Habermas has brought his prestige and powerful eloquence to 
bear. His countless public interventions have been published across Europe in many 
languages. “Democracy is at stake,” he has warned time and time again,
158
 and Europe 
risks establishing a post-democratic regime of “executive federalism.”
159
 These drastic 
messages, though, are always accompanied by signals of hope and political appeals. He 
intends listeners to view the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen the European project. 
The “strength” which he advocates is not merely Europe’s managerial potential; to 
Habermas, “more Europe” also means a deepening of Europe’s democratic credentials. 
 
In contrast to so many commentators on the debate regarding the financial crisis and the 
future of Europe, in his passionate pronouncements Habermas pursues a demanding and 
coherent agenda based upon his long-term explorations of the many facets of the 
European project. His work on this theoretical basis started with the essay Citizenship and 
National Identity,
160
 just prior to the publication of his magnum opus on legal theory.
161
 
Since then, Habermas has ceaselessly occupied himself with the European project, both as 
a citizen and a theoretician. As a theoretician, he conceives of the process of 
Europeanization as a challenge to his theory of the democratically constituted nation-state; 
from the perspective of the citizen, he views the process as a response to the catastrophes 
of the Twentieth century, for which Germany bears so much responsibility. This intent is 
manifested in the project, as well as the objective to defend democratic welfare-state 
accomplishments in the processes of globalization and European integration. As a 
theoretician on the constitutionalization of Europe, Habermas seeks to accomplish a type 
of analysis that not only grasps the facticity of the processes of Europeanization, but also 
achieves a normative concept that both provides criteria and identifies the institutional 
                                            
158 See e.g., Rettet die Würde der Demokratie, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 4, 2011. A number of these 
statements are reprinted in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, ZUR VERFASSUNG EUROPAS: EIN ESSAY 97-129 (2011); a more recent 
example can be found in his essay in Le Monde of Oct. 27, 2011 (English version available at 
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1106741-juergen-habermas-democracy-stake). Habermas’ entire 
work is comprehensively documented and updated weekly in the Habermas Forum: 
http://www.habermasforum.dk,  the most recent being, Jürgen Habermas, Merkel’s European Failure: Germany 
Dozes on a Volcano, in DER SPIEGEL, 5 (July 2013). A great number of his pertinent essays haverecently been 
reprinted in the Journal Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 3/2014, 85–416 under the title Drer 
Aufklärer Jürgen Habermas at the occasion of his 85th birthday on June 18, 2014. They can be downloaded freely 
at http://habermas-rawls.blogspot.dk/2014/06/e-book-der-aufklarer-jurgen-habermas.html. 
159 See Jürgen Habermas, A Pact for or against Europe? in WHAT DOES GERMANY THINK ABOUT EUROPE? 83–89 (Ulrike 
Guérot & Jacqueline Hénard eds., 2011). 
160 Jürgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity, in STAATSBÜRGERSCHAFT UND NATIONALE IDENTITÄT (1991), 
reprinted in BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 491–516 (1999). 
161 Id. In German: FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG. BEITRÄGE ZUR DISKURSTHEORIE DES RECHTS UND DES DEMOKRATISCHEN 
RECHTSSTAATS (1992). 
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conditions for the question of whether the configurations emerging in the process of 
Europeanization “deserve recognition.”
162
 
 
Following his more recent interventions as a citizen, Habermas has approached this 
aspiration again.
163
 He identifies the institutional causes for the crisis and states his 
polemics against the crisis management in Europe in terminology that critically transforms 
Schmitt’s affirmative observations on the steadily growing power of the executive into 
critical objections to the present course of the process of Europeanization.
164
 “Post-
democratic executive federalism” is the term he uses to denote—and to criticize—
Europe’s praxis.
165
 The European Union must not continue on the path it has taken due to 
the pressure of the crisis, but cease to coordinate the relevant policies in the 
gubernative/governative-bureaucratic style which has been customary until now and take 
the path of adequate democratic legalization. 
 
The theoretical core of Habermas’s essay is found in the reasons he gives for this postulate, 
in which Habermas specifically continues deliberations by Armin von Bogdandy, Claudio 
Franzius, and Ulrich K. Preuß.
166
 He places a dual role for Europe’s citizens alongside the 
recognition that these rights are equally rooted in the democratic constitutional state: 
They remain citizens of their states, but become citizens of the Union as well. With this 
construct, Europe’s ability to be a democracy becomes more theoretically plausible. In 
addition, however, the construct promises to provide criteria for democratic 
constitutionalization of European governance and to come to terms with its functional 
requirements. But it is precisely at this point that it remains under specified. It is difficult to 
imagine which institutional architecture might satisfy Habermas’s normative ideas.
167
 As 
                                            
162 For a reconstruction of Habermas’ works, which, however, seeks to (re-) interpret the author for his own ends, 
see Christian Joerges, Reflections on Habermas’ Postnational Constellation, in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, VOL. 2 XI–XXI 
(Camil Ungureanu, Klaus Guenther & Christian Joerges eds., 2011). 
163 Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International Law, 
23 EURO. J. OF INT’L L. 335, 335-348 (2012). One can no longer be sure about the seriousness of this distinction. In 
the preface to his most recent book, JÜRGEN HABERMAS, IM SOG DER TECHNOKRATIE. KLEINE POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN XII 8 n. 2 
(2013), Habermas expresses some discontent with the fact that his public interventions did not make it into the 
general academic discourses. 
164 Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12 at para. 296. 
165 See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Bringing the Integration of Citizens into Line with the Integration of States, 18 
EURO. L. J. 485, 487 (2012). 
166 See Armin von Bogdandy, Basic Principles, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13, 44 (Armin von 
Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2010); CLAUDIO FRANZIUS, EUROPÄISCHES VERFASSUNGSDENKEN 49 (2010); CLAUDIO 
FRANZIUS & ULRICH K, PREUß, DIE ZUKUNFT DER EUROPÄISCHEN DEMOKRATIE 33 (2012). 
167 See Nicole Scicluna, EU Constitutionalism in the Twenty-first Century: Politics and Law in Crisis 101 (2013) 
(unpublished Ph.D Thesis, La Trobe University): 
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long as extreme uncertainties as to the causes of the crisis and the possibility of its 
democratic cure persist, it is even more difficult to understand which kind of practical 
guidance they might provide. We are witnessing instead a reemergence of age-old 
animosities in Europe’s publics, the rise of populist movements and an erosion of the 
legitimacy of the governments in precisely those countries most deeply affected by the 
crisis. It remains unclear how a political European leadership with secure democratic 
legitimation could be established. “Until these questions and problems are addressed,” 
American political scientist John McCormick noted in much more tranquil times, “Schmitt’s 
work and career haunts the study of European integration like a spectre.”
168
 
 
F. Epilogue: From “One Size Fits All” to “Unity in Diversity!” 
 
The debate on the transformation of Europe’s constitutional constellation, its new 
Verfassungswirklichkeit,
169
 has only just begun and is bound to continue. Pertinent 
characterizations oscillate between Executive Federalism (Jürgen Habermas),
170
 a 
Distributive Regulatory State or New Sovereignty with Largely Unfettered Power of Rule 
(Damian Chalmers),
171
 a Konsolidierungsstaat (Consolidating State, Wolfgang Streeck),
172
 
Authoritarian Managerialism (Christian Joerges and Maria Weimer),
173
 an Unconstrained 
                                                                                                                
So far it has proved difficult, if not impossible, to have a full and 
inclusive debate on the lofty ideal of ‘political union’ while the 
Eurozone crisis is still in its emergency phase. As long as this state of 
emergency persists, European politicians and officials will continue to 
be heavily focused on the pragmatic, day-to-day steps that (in their 
opinions) are necessary to save it. 
See also Nicole Scicluna, EU constitutionalism in flux? Is the Eurozone crisis precipitating centralisation or 
diffusion?, 18 EURO. L. J. 489, 500 (2012). 
168 John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Europe: Cultural, Imperial and Spatial, Proposals for European Integration, 
1923-1955, in DARKER LEGACIES OF L. IN EURO. 133, 141 (Christian Joerges & Navraj S. Ghaleigh eds., 2003). 
169 The contrast between Verfassungsrecht (constitutional law) and Verfassungsswirklichkeit (constitutional 
reality) is another problematical German legacy—again with root in CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 107 (1928) 
(reprinted in 2010). 
170 Jürgen Habermas, A Pact for or against Europe?, in WHAT DOES GERMANY THINK ABOUT EUROPE? 83–89 (Ulrike 
Guérot & Jacqueline Hénard eds., 2011). 
171 Damian Chalmers, The European Redistributive State and the Need for a European Law of Struggle, 18 
EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 667 (2012) and Damian Chalmers, European Restatements of Sovereignty, (LSE Working 
Paper No. 10,  2013). 
172 WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE DELAYED CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 97–164 (2014). 
173 Christian Joerges and Maria Weimer, A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: No Alternative? (2012). 
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Expertocracy (Fritz W. Scharpf),
174
 an Unbound Executive (Deirdre Curtin),
175
 and 
Krisenkapitalismus (Crisis Constitutionalism, Hans-Jürgen Bieling).
176
 None of these 
characterizations are in line with the ever-so positive and optimistic presentation of the 
integration project which we have been reading for decades.
177
 Among the features 
underlined include the lack of a theoretical/conceptual paradigm; a radical disregard of 
Friedrich A. von Hayek’s warnings against the “pretence of knowledge,”
178
 a disregard of 
the rule of law, and a thorough de-legalization of governance.
179
 
 
What does all this mean for European citizenship? What was once a cherished 
accomplishment is now characterized by inequalities between the North and the South, 
the social exclusions of a large part of the European population, and political 
disempowerment. The present calamities are not without precursors,
180
 but the 
ambivalences of the vision of transnational, albeit nationally dis-embedded, citizenship 
have, by now, become increasingly apparent and disquieting. I am not trying to go, in this 
already overly lengthy paper, into any detailed analysis and refer instead to the 
contributions by Giubboni.
181
 Just as it is misconceived to subject a socio-economically and 
politically diverse Union to the discipline of one currency, the construction of a uniform 
“European social model” is a similarly misconceived project.
182
 
 
                                            
174 Fritz W. Scharpf, Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area, in Adjusting to European Diversity: 
ADJUSTING TO EUROPEAN DIVERSITY: THE END OF THE EUROCRATS’ DREAM (Damian Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs & 
Christian Joerges eds. (forthcoming 2015). 
175 Deirdre Curtin, The Challenge of Executive Democracy in Europe, 77 MODERN L. REV. 1, 1–32 (2014). 
176 Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Das Projekt der Euro-Rettung und die Widersprüche des europäischen 
Krisenkonstitutionalismus, 20 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN 89, 89–103 (2013). 
177 For a critique of the European “political culture of total optimism” and its weak underpinnings, see 
Giandomenico Majone, RETHINKING THE UNION OF EUROPE POST-CRISIS. HAS INTEGRATION GONE TOO FAR? 74–80 (2014). 
178 Friedrich A. von Hayek, Nobel Memorial Lecture (Dec. 11, 1974), http://pavroz.ru/files/hayekpretence.pdf. 
179 This is why law should not be called the culprit here; but see K.A. Armstrong, New Governance and the 
European Union: An Empirical and Conceptual Critique, in CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: LIBER 
AMICORUM DAVID M TRUBEK n. 10 and accompanying text (Gráínne de Búrca, Claire Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott eds., 
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2244762-. 
180 See Michelle Everson, A very cosmopolitan citizenship; but who pays the price? in MICHAEL DOUGAN, NIAMH NIC 
SHUIBHNE AND ELEANOR SPAVENTA, EMPOWERMENT AND DISEMPOWERMENT OF THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN 145 (2013). 
181 Stefano Giubboni, European citizenship, labour law and social rights in times of crisis?, this GLJ Special Issue. 
182 It is worth noting that very similar disappointments are also becoming a concern in the accession states; see 
for an instructive analysis Bojan Bugaric, Europe Against the Left? On Legal Limits to Progressive Politics (LEQS 
Paper No. 61, 2013). 
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All foregoing, disheartening diagnoses notwithstanding, this epilogue should not conclude 
without an outline of what has been announced in the introductory remark: “But where 
danger threatens, that which saves from it also grows.”
183
 The present state of the Union is 
unsustainable. The efforts to force Member States and their citizens into the straitjacket of 
new economic governance are bound to fail. The Euro-crisis, somewhat paradoxically and 
inadvertently, underlines the urgent need for pluralistic variety—the toleration of 
disagreement and contestation—rather than an ever-more centralized executive Europe. 
The failures of Europe generate growing unrest and protest among dis-empowered citizens 
who are exposed to austerity measures, experienced as hopeless, and, to a considerable 
degree, useless suffering. They increasingly provoke the political public, national 
parliaments, and even the EP. It will become progressively more apparent that it is 
impossible for the great majority of signatories of the Fiscal Compact to comply with the 
requirements imposed upon them. It will also become ever more apparent that it is simply 
impracticable for the great majority of signatories to comply with the requirements 
imposed upon them, and the “die neue Umständlichkeit” (cumbersomeness) of all these 
procedures will affect their impact.
184
 
 
Hence, there is room for maneuver. And yet, to date, any substantial transformation of the 
established regime remains out of sight. Is it nevertheless conceivable that, in the not-too-
distant future, the new policy coordination within the annually repeating European 
Semester, the reporting and multilateral surveillance obligations, the macro-economic 
imbalance procedures, and the responses to country-specific recommendations will lead to 
new assessments of the weight of socio-economic diversity. Growing awareness of the 
social embeddedness of markets, acknowledgement of the different regulatory, social, and 
economic cultures in the Member States, may well generate a search for innovative 
responses to Europe’s complex conflict constellations—and sooner or later, even to the 
developments of standards and criteria which discipline authoritarian managerialism. 
 
It would be absurdly pretentious to promise a “solution” to these difficulties. But we must 
not shy away from the construction of projects which seek to respond to the problems 
which we have identified. The project which I have pursued for more than a decade is 
“conflicts-law constitutionalism.”
185
 Its analytical and normative core can be briefly 
summarized as follows: As long as the shape of a pan-European democracy lacks contours, 
and the conditions for its realization remain entirely unclear, we must explore alternatives 
which take the difficulties the European project must not, and cannot, avoid into account. 
                                            
183 FRIEDRICH HÖLDERLIN, note 9 supra. 
184 For a thorough reconstruction see BEATE BRAAMS, KOORDINIERUNG ALS KOMPETENZKATEGORIE 15–49 (2013). 
185 See supra notes 31 & 33. For an evaluation see the contributions in Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the 
Postnational Constellation, 2:2 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY (Christian Joerges, Poul F. Kjaer & Tommi Ralli eds., 
2011). The core premises of the approach are explained in the introductory chapter by the three editors on “A 
New Type of Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational Constellation,” 153–165. 
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How should we respond to the reality that the socio-economic disparities in the expanded 
Union are not melting away? Which conclusions should be drawn from the insight that the 
neo-liberal interventions to which the “varieties of capitalism” in the Union have been 
exposed have repeatedly disintegrative effects? If it is impossible to construct a uniform 
welfare-state model, is it then advisable to dismantle Europe’s welfare-state traditions 
altogether? If it is not our goal to suppress the painful memories of Europeans, to not iron 
out the differences between their bitter historical experiences, to not waste the wealth of 
their cultures, must not tolerance therefore determine the status of European citizens, 
tolerance which is established in law and based upon the principle of mutual acceptance? 
These questions are not merely rhetorical. They have a normative point of reference in the 
optimistic “motto” of the ill-fated Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as “United 
in Diversity,”
186
 which need not remain an empty phrase. My proposal for putting this 
motto into practice is as follows: Europe must find its constitutional form in a new type of 
“conflicts law,” which is characterized by two guiding principles. Firstly, the supranational 
European conflict of laws is to require Member States of the Union to take their neighbors’ 
concerns seriously—in this respect, it aims at compensating the structural democratic 
deficits of nation-statehood. Secondly, this European conflicts law should structure 
cooperative solutions to problems in specific areas—thereby reacting to the inter-
dependencies of modern societies. Suffice it here to underline three points. 
 
We should shift our attention from the democratic deficit of the EU to the structural 
democracy deficit of its Member States. Nation states continuously, and unavoidably, 
violate the principle that those affected by their laws can “in the last instance” understand 
themselves as their authors. The Member States of the Union can be requested to take the 
impact of their own policies on other jurisdictions into account and vice versa—they can 
expect that their concerns be included in the decision-making processes of the others. In 
the Union, these commandments correspond to the common commitments to democracy 
which European law is legitimated to implement. European law has the vocation, and some 
potential, to compensate these deficits. It can derive its legitimacy from its capacity to 
correct the democracy deficits of Member States.
187
 
                                            
186 Draft European Constitutional Treaty arts. 1–8 (Dec. 16, 2004). 
187 It seems worth noting that Habermas expresses the same ideas in his recent work on the constitutionalisation 
of international law:  
Nation-states . . . encumber each other with the external effects of 
decisions that impinge on third parties who had no say in the 
decision-making process. Hence, states cannot escape the need for 
regulation and coordination in the expanding horizon of a world 
society that is increasingly self-programming, even at the cultural 
level. 
See Jürgen Habermas Does the Contitutionalization of International Law still have a Chance?, in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
THE DIVIDED WEST 113, 176 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2007). 
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The second vocation and task stems from the erosion of the potential of the nation state to 
resolve problems autonomously. In the Union, this dependence upon the other transforms 
itself into duties of cooperation which European law is legitimated to organize. The 
“constitutionalization of co-operation”
188
 must then seek to derive its validity from the 
normative credentials of the very interactions that it organizes. 
 
Conflicts-law constitutionalism was meant to be elaborated further and to proceed as a 
“re-constructive project.” For example, a re-conceptualization of European law which 
would, to a considerable degree, be compatible with European law as it stood, and be able 
to orient its further development. The re-constructive status was based upon its 
sociological premises which reflect the European constellation more adequately than the 
orthodoxy of European law. It seems, indeed, overdue to reconsider the integration 
project in the light of Europe’s ever-growing diversity, to take the conflicts which this 
diversity generates into account, and to re-orient Europe’s agenda from harmonization and 
unity to the management of complex conflict constellations. 
 
The last point is the most difficult to defend. The reconstructive status of the conflicts-law 
approach was based on its sociological premises which reflect the conflict-laden European 
constellation more adequately than the orthodoxy of European law. All that seemed 
needed, and indeed overdue, was to reconsider the integration project in the light of 
Europe’s ever growing diversity, to take the conflicts which this diversity generated into 
account, and to re-orient Europe’s agenda from harmonization and unity to the 
management of complex conflict constellations. Following the financial crisis, such hopes 
and ambitions are obviously unrealistic, with substantial backing in already existing 
European law. This bold assertion has suffered numerous setbacks. For example, through 
the de-legalization and de-formalization of European governance.
189
 At present, under the 
pressures of European crisis management, it continues to dwindle, and conflicts-laws 
constitutionalism is, for the time being, a merely critical project.
190
 What can nevertheless 
be explored are the conflict constellations which the new modes of economic governance 
and the imposition of austerity politics on a large part of the Union generate—together 
with the space for counter-movements which the unfortunate state of the Union may 
generate. That, although, requires another project. 
 
                                            
188 See Christian Joerges, Poul F. Kjaer & Tommi Ralli A New Type of Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the 
Postnational Constellation, in CONFLICTS LAW AS CONSTITUTIONAL FORM IN THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION, 2:2 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 159–160. 
189 See supra notes 73, 76. 
190 See Christian Joerges & Maria Weimer, A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: No Alternative?, in 
CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: LIBER AMICORUM DAVID M TRUBEK 295 (Gráínne de Búrca, Claire 
Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott eds., 2013).  
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